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THE HORROR CHAMBER:
UNQUALIFIED IMPUNITY IN PRISON
David M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle*
The federal courts have been open to prisoners’ constitutional claims for half a century, but
to this day, the availability of federal litigation has not stopped prisoners from being tortured,
maimed, killed, or otherwise made to suffer chilling abuse. The failure of litigation as a deterrent
is due in part to a confluence of legal and situational factors—doctrinal deference, statutory
hurdles, and the many difficulties associated with litigating a civil rights case against one’s
jailers—that make prison-conditions cases virtually impossible to win. We call this combination
of factors “practical immunity.” Practical immunity amounts to a formidable barrier against
successful prison-conditions cases. When practical immunity is combined with the well-known
doctrine of qualified immunity, it makes the threat of a money judgment against prison defendants almost empty. The Supreme Court’s failure to take stock of practical immunity may help to
explain why the landscape is so skewed against prisoners, and why prison officials enjoy a legal
regime so forgiving that it borders on de facto absolute immunity.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2017, it came to light that guards at Spring Creek Correctional
Center in Alaska forced male prisoners to strip naked, handcuffed them,
attached them to a “dog leash,” and paraded them outdoors in front of
female staff.1 Prisoners were then placed in frigid cells without clothing or
blankets; the walls of these cells were smeared with blood and feces.2 A state
investigation substantiated the prisoners’ complaints, characterizing their
treatment as “humiliat[ing] and degrad[ing].”3 Similar horrors—and more
serious ones—are far too common in American prisons and jails. Prison staff
have held prisoners down in boiling water until their skin peeled off, shocked
prisoners with cattle prods, left prisoners catatonic and covered in urine in
telephone-booth-sized cages, compressed prisoners in restraint chairs to the
point of squeezing out their intestines, kneed pregnant female prisoners in
the stomach, and allowed prisoners to rot to death from gangrene.4
The law no longer condones such abuse. During the civil rights era,
American courts rejected the “slave of the state” theory of incarceration,
which had long denied prisoners any constitutional right to humane conditions.5 “There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country,” the Supreme Court of the era famously declared.6
But this shift, and subsequent prisoners’ rights litigation, has failed to contain the torture: the inhumane treatment of prisoners goes on. Why?
Part of the explanation, we propose, is that a combination of interrelated legal and situational barriers dooms many prison-conditions suits from
the start. The legal barriers are both doctrinal and statutory—they include:
(1) constitutional doctrine that is extremely deferential to prison defendants,
especially the standards by which courts evaluate prisoners’ claims under the
First and Eighth Amendments;7 and (2) the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
especially its administrative-exhaustion and physical-injury requirements.8
The situational barriers are products of the prison environment—they
include: (1) the difficulty of finding counsel to represent prisoners; (2) the
difficulty of conducting legal research and collecting evidence while incarcer1 STATE OF ALASKA OMBUDSMAN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, OMBUDSMAN COMPLAINT A20131560 (2017); Jonah Engel Bromwich, Guards Paraded Alaska Inmates Naked on a ‘Dog Leash,’
Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/us/alaskainmates-stripped-naked.html.
2 STATE OF ALASKA OMBUDSMAN, supra note 1, at 3; Bromwich, supra note 1.
3 STATE OF ALASKA OMBUDSMAN, supra note 1, at 10.
4 See infra Part I.
5 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)).
6 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
7 See infra subsection II.A.1.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012).
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ated; (3) procedural and doctrinal minutiae that act as traps for even the
most well-prepared prison litigants; and (4) prisoners’ vulnerability to retaliation from correctional staff.
Together, these legal and situational barriers clothe prison officials in
what we call “practical immunity.”9 Practical immunity is not a formal
exemption from suit, but it might as well be: the legal and situational barriers
constituting practical immunity make it all but impossible for a prisoner to
establish a prison official’s liability for abuse.10 Indeed, practical immunity
insulates prison defendants from liability at least as much as qualified immunity. Yet because it derives from a complex interaction of doctrinal, statutory,
and situational factors, practical immunity is even less subject to scrutiny than
qualified immunity.
Practical immunity operates as a largely unacknowledged screening
mechanism for prison-conditions cases, turning qualified immunity into a
backstop against the few cases that make it through. The multilayered
regime of practical and qualified immunity makes money judgments against
prison officials so vanishingly rare that in reality, prison officials enjoy a kind
of unqualified impunity. Is it any wonder, then, that the threat of litigation
has not shielded our prison population from degrading mistreatment?
This Article consists of three parts. Part I examines horrifying abuse in
American prisons and jails. Part II illustrates how the legal and situational
barriers constituting practical immunity make most prison-conditions cases
unwinnable. Part III argues that the present liability regime, which borders
on de facto absolute immunity, cannot serve as a credible check on individual or systemic abuse in prisons and jails.
We conclude by suggesting that the current jurisprudence fails to take
stock of the combined effects of the various obstacles that incarcerated plaintiffs confront in litigation. In calibrating the balance between liability for
misconduct and protection from suit, courts generally fail to account for the
effects of practical immunity; as a result, they develop standards that overprotect prison officials.
A more balanced approach to prison-conditions cases would acknowledge both practical and qualified immunity, viewing them as two components of an overarching system of civil liability for prisoner abuse. Given that
broader field of view, a court might conclude, for example, that qualified
immunity is unwise and unnecessary in the prison context because practical
immunity already provides sufficient protection against unwarranted liability
for good-faith mistakes.

9 See David M. Shapiro, Lenient in Theory, Dumb in Fact: Prison, Speech, and Scrutiny, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972, 979 (2016). Of course, the legal/situational distinction is not
absolute.
10 The standard definition for “immunity” encompasses an “exemption from . . . liability.” Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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I. THE HORROR CHAMBER
Abuse by staff in American prisons and jails is rampant. Correctional
officers frequently assault and otherwise grievously injure incarcerated men
and women. Nearly half a century ago, a federal judge declared incarceration to be “as intolerable within the United States as was the institution of
slavery, equally brutalizing to all involved, equally toxic to the social system,
equally subversive of the brotherhood of man, even more costly by some standards, and probably less rational.”11 More recently, another federal court
described the Texas prison system as a “culture of sadistic and malicious violence,”12 while a Mississippi judge characterized a youth facility as “a picture
of such horror as should be unrealized anywhere in the civilized world.”13
The problem is not attributable to a scattered handful of sadists. Experts
in law,14 psychology,15 prisoners’ rights litigation,16 human rights,17 and
11 Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 548–49 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev’d, 489 F.2d 1335
(7th Cir. 1973).
12 Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (quoting Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 929 (S.D. Tex. 1999)).
13 Order Approving Settlement at ¶ 10, DePriest v. Epps, No. 3:10-cv-00663 (S.D. Miss.
Mar. 26, 2012).
14 Sharon Dolovich has observed that:
[E]ven those prison officials who in their private lives would be regarded as “normal, morally upright . . . people,” may [in the prison context] come to treat
inmates in ways that even the officers themselves would previously have viewed as
repugnant and inhumane. In this way, the institution itself creates the conditions
for cruel treatment and the violation of the state’s carceral burden. To some
extent, the desensitization of prison officials to the suffering of prisoners may be
an “adaptive” mechanism, necessary if the officers are to be able to do their jobs.
But the fact remains that, for a combination of reasons, prison officials often
develop an extremely dismissive attitude toward the people in their charge. And
over time, those officers who do so will likely become less troubled by the possibility of prisoners’ suffering and may even cease to see prisoners as fellow “persons
to whom one owes moral obligations at all.”
Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881,
933–34 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT:
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 307 (2007); and then quoting KELSEY
KAUFFMAN, PRISON OFFICERS AND THEIR WORLD 230 (1988)).
15 Craig Haney, The Perversions of Prison: On the Origins of Hypermasculinity and Sexual
Violence in Confinement, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 126 (2011) (explaining that prisons
“impos[e] institutional practices and employ[ ] personnel that categorize, regard, and
treat [prisoners] as if they were utterly interchangeable, devoid of the unique needs, concerns, or talents that make each of us individuals”).
16 Donald Specter, Making Prisons Safe: Strategies for Reducing Violence, 22 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 125, 134 (2006) (“[T]he lessons of the last few decades of court intervention and
academic research have demonstrated that the amount of violence in a prison is a function
of its culture, the effectiveness of its management, and, at times, the political reality that
excuses the mistreatment of prisoners.”).
17 Jamie Fellner et al., Callous and Cruel: Use of Force Against Inmates with Mental Disabilities in US Jails and Prisons, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 12, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/
2015/05/12/callous-and-cruel/use-force-against-inmates-mental-disabilities-us-jails-and
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organizational theory18 have endorsed the view that structural characteristics
of the prison environment increase the likelihood of staff either abusing prisoners or permitting abuse to go on under their watch. The most wellknown—and perhaps most controversial—example is the Stanford Prison
Experiment, in which researchers randomly divided a group of college students into guards and prisoners and had them carry out their assigned roles
in a simulated prison context. The results were disturbing and may help to
explain why prisoners face such frequent and wide-ranging abuses:
The most hostile guards on each shift moved spontaneously into the leadership roles of giving orders and deciding on punishments. They became role
models whose behavior was emulated by other members of the shift. Despite
minimal contact between the three separate guard shifts and nearly 16 hours
a day spent away from the prison, the absolute level of aggression as well as
more subtle and “creative” forms of aggression manifested, increased in a
spiralling [sic] function. Not to be tough and arrogant was to be seen as a
sign of weakness by the guards and even those “good” guards who did not
get as drawn into the power syndrome as the others respected the implicit
norm of never contradicting or even interfering with an action of a more
hostile guard on their shift.19

Whatever the etiology of prison abuse, reports by federal agencies bear
out its pervasiveness. A study funded by the Office of Justice Programs and
the National Institute of Mental Health found that 6964 general population
male prisoners surveyed reported 1466 incidents of staff-on-prisoner physical
assault over a six-month period—meaning that approximately one of every

(“In some correctional facilities, a culture of violence develops in which staff routinely,
maliciously, and even savagely abuse inmates, including inmates with mental health
problems, using force, fear, reprisal, and retaliation to control them. All levels of staff
become complicit, actively or passively, in the widespread physical abuse.”).
18 Ifeoma Ajunwa, “Bad Barrels”: An Organizational-Based Analysis of the Human Rights
Abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 75, 78 (2014) (analyzing the U.S.
military’s abuses of prisoners at Abu Ghraib through the lens of organizational theory and
arguing that guard-on-inmate abuse in the United States is at least significantly attributable
to structural and cultural characteristics of U.S. prisons).
19 Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. CRIM. &
PENOLOGY 69, 94 (1973). To be sure, the experiment has not been without its critics. See,
e.g., Ali Banuazizi & Siamak Movahedi, Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison: A Methodological Analysis, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 152, 156 (1975) (critiquing the methodology of
the Stanford Prison Experiment and offering alternative explanations for the subjects’
behavior, including subjects’ exposure to “strong social stereotypes of how guards and prisoners act” and “numerous cues” in the experimental context “pointing to the experimental hypothesis”); Thomas Carnahan & Sam McFarland, Revisiting the Stanford Prison
Experiment: Could Participant Self-Selection Have Led to the Cruelty?, 33 PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 603, 604 (2007) (suggesting that the outcome of the Stanford Prison
Experiment was at least partially attributable to self-selection among volunteers); Maria
Konnikova, The Real Lesson of the Stanford Prison Experiment, NEW YORKER (June 12, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/the-real-lesson-of-the-stanfordprison-experiment (summarizing criticisms of the Stanford Prison Experiment).
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five prisoners reported suffering such abuse.20 Statistics on reported sexual
violence committed by staff are similarly grim. According to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, “[a]n estimated 1.2% of former [state] prisoners reported
that they unwillingly had sex or sexual contact with facility staff.”21 If that
rate were to remain constant for the nation’s entire incarcerated population—roughly 2.2 million people22—it would amount to 26,000 incidents of
staff sexual abuse in a period of just over six months. These numbers are
necessarily inexact, but at the very least, they strongly suggest that assault is
an ever-present danger to the millions of people locked up in the United
States.
Statistics, no matter how shocking, cannot fully convey the nightmares to
which prisoners in this country have been, and continue to be, subjected.
Below, we provide a relatively small cross section of abuses that make it clear
why we so urgently need increased accountability in American prisons and
jails.
A. T.R. v. South Carolina Department of Corrections
A South Carolina prisoner named Jerod Cook was “placed in a restraint
chair” after cutting his own arm; officers kept him there for four hours, even
as his blood pooled on the floor and he begged for medical care.23 Another
prisoner at the same facility, Baxter Vinson, was placed in a restraint chair for
two hours after cutting his own abdomen; a video recording of the incident
showed that Vinson was “eviscerating, with his intestine coming out of the
20 Nancy Wolff & Jing Shi, Contextualization of Physical and Sexual Assault in Male Prisons:
Incidents and Their Aftermath, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 58, 62, 64, 65, 76 (2009).
21 ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION
REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008, at 8 (2012). It is important to note that these
numbers are based on self-reports, which makes them imperfectly reliable. Some prisoners
may have exaggerated their claims; others who were abused may have denied it out of
shame or fear. The number of sexual abuse incidents in state prisons substantiated by
internal investigation is lower than the self-reported number, but it remains deeply troubling: the Bureau of Justice Statistics has found that “[s]tate prison administrators reported
537 substantiated incidents of sexual victimization in 2011 . . . . About 52% of substantiated
incidents of sexual victimization in 2011 involved only inmates, while 48% of substantiated
incidents involved staff with inmates.” ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
REPORT: SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY ADULT CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2009–11,
at 1 (2014); see also Anthony C. Thompson, What Happens Behind Locked Doors: The Difficulty
of Addressing and Eliminating Rape in Prison, 35 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 119,
132–33 (2009) (“Many researchers have noted that rather than viewing prison rape as a
crime that requires intervention, prison staff members at times see rape as a means of
deterring other forms of violence in the prison.”).
22 DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 1 (2016).
23 Order Granting Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs at 19, T.R. v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., No.
2005-CP-40-2925 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Jan. 8, 2014).
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abdominal wall.”24 Guards could be seen “tightening the restraints, thereby
putting additional pressure on [Vinson’s] abdomen.”25
B. Borum v. Swisher County
Terry Borum had once “attempted to commit suicide with a shotgun,”
which “destroyed significant portions of [his] face.”26 “As a result,” Borum
“could not speak clearly, had difficulty breathing, and was blind in one eye.
He also could not eat solid food and instead required a liquid diet, which was
administered through a feeding tube sewn inside his stomach.”27 Borum was
arrested and “detained in Swisher County jail,” where, over the course of
several days, he “received no medical care of any kind, despite the fact that
he began hallucinating, behaved erratically, and was likely suffering from
delirium tremens . . . a severe form of alcohol withdrawal that causes tremors
and other changes to the nervous system.”28 Jail officers “failed to provide”
Borum the liquid diet he needed and fed him only “a mixture of honey and
orange juice, which was the County’s standard method of ‘treating’ inmates
experiencing alcohol withdrawal symptoms.”29 As Borum’s “physical and
mental condition continued to deteriorate, jail officials placed him in a detox
cell, where he spent the night screaming incoherently, talking to invisible
friends, and trying to pull an imaginary person out of the toilet.”30 And yet
no one called an ambulance, a doctor, or 911 until much later, when Borum
“collapsed . . . struck his head, and was knocked unconscious.”31 He later
died at the hospital.32
C. In re Death of Bradley Ballard
Bradley Ballard was a thirty-nine-year-old man suffering from mental illness; he died while imprisoned at Rikers Island.33 According to a report
issued by the New York State Commission of Correction, Ballard “was keeplocked in his cell for six days prior to his death and was denied access to his
life-supporting prescribed medications, denied access to medical and psychiatric care, denied access to essential mandated services such as showers and
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Borum v. Swisher Cty., No. 2:14-CV-127-J, 2015 WL 327508, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26,
2015).
27 Id.
28 Id. at *2.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Benjamin Weiser, City to Pay $5.75 Million over Death of Mentally Ill Inmate at Rikers
Island, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/nyregion/
rikers-island-lawsuit-bradley-ballard.html.
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exercise periods, and denied running water for his cell.”34 Ultimately, he
“was discovered . . . lying in his cell naked, unresponsive, covered with urine
and feces, and in critical condition.”35 The Commission concluded that if
Ballard had “received adequate and appropriate medical and mental health
care and supervision and intervention when he became critically ill, his death
would have been prevented.”36
D. Payne v. Parnell
Dale Parnell, a Texas prisoner, was outside working his prison job when
a guard, “without provocation,” approached him from behind and “shocked
him in the back with a cattle prod.”37 Parnell tried to run, fleeing into a
bathroom; the guard followed him and tried to shock him again by using the
door handle as a conductor.38
E. Nunez v. City of New York
In 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a findings letter on the
treatment of detainees at Rikers Island.39 The letter documents a litany of
abuses, including an episode in which officers “forcibly extracted” two mentally ill prisoners from their cells, transported them to the medical clinic,
“restrained” them, and beat them so badly that one prisoner was still “spitting
up blood . . . more than a month later.”40
F. Castro v. County of Los Angeles
Jonathan Castro, a detainee at a West Hollywood police station who “was
too intoxicated to care for himself,” spent a full minute “pounding on his cell
door” after an “enraged and combative” arrestee, Jonathan Gonzalez, was
placed in the cell with him.41 Jail video showed that the supervising officer,
Christopher Solomon, “remained unresponsive, seated at a desk nearby” the
entire time.42 Twenty minutes later, an “unpaid community volunteer”
walked by the cell and saw Gonzalez touching Castro’s thigh in an inappro34

N.Y. STATE COMM’N OF CORR., IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF BRADLEY BALLARD,
ANNA M. KROSS CENTER, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION OF CORRECTION 2 (2014).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Payne v. Parnell, 246 F. App’x 884, 885 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
38 Id.
39 Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil
Rights Div., to Bill de Blasio, Mayor of New York (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.prisonlegal
news.org/media/publications/DOJ%20Report%20on%20CRIPA%20Investigation%20of
%20Rikers%20Island%2C%202014.pdf.
40 Id. at 14.
41 Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1065, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc). One of the authors of this Article, David Shapiro, was counsel for a group of amici
curiae in Castro.
42 Id. at 1073.
AN INMATE OF THE
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priate manner.43 The volunteer reported this to Officer Solomon, but Solomon waited six minutes to respond.44 By that point, Gonzalez was “stomping
on Castro’s head,” and Castro was “lying unconscious in a pool of blood.”45
Castro spent a month in a hospital and four years in a care center, and suffered long-term cognitive impairments.46
G. Ross v. Blake
Shaidon Blake, a Maryland prisoner, was assaulted by two guards while
being moved from his cell.47 One of the guards began to shove Blake, who
was handcuffed.48 When Blake protested, one guard held “Blake against the
wall, [while the other guard] wrapped a key ring around his fingers and then
punched Blake at least four times in the face in quick succession. [The
guard] paused briefly, then punched Blake in the face again.”49 The two
guards “then took Blake to the ground by lifting him up and dropping him.
[One guard] dropped his knee onto Blake’s chest, and he and [the other
guard] restrained Blake until other officers arrived.”50 Blake “was later diagnosed with nerve damage.”51
H. Madrid v. Gomez
Vaughn Dortch, a “mentally ill inmate” of California’s Pelican Bay State
Prison, “suffered second-and third-degree burns over one-third of his body”
when a group of correctional officers held him, handcuffed, in a bathtub
filled with “scalding” water.52 During the incident, which took place in the
prison infirmary, a nurse heard one of the officers say, “looks like we’re going
to have a white boy before this is through . . . his skin is so dirty and so rotten,
it’s all fallen off.”53 The nurse observed that “from just below the buttocks
down, [Dortch’s] skin had peeled off and was hanging in large clumps
around his legs, which had turned white with some redness.”54 The officers
“made no effort to seek any medical assistance or advice”; one of them
declared that Dortch “had been living in his own feces and urine for three
months, and if he was going to get infected, he would have been already.”55
43 Id. at 1065.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1855 (2016).
48 Id.
49 Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693, 695 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1850.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
53 Id. at 1167.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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Arturo Castillo, another Pelican Bay prisoner, was huddled beneath his
mattress when guards sought to extract him from his cell.56 Though Castillo
was “small in stature” and “made no verbal threats or aggressive gestures,”
correctional officers fired “two rounds from a 38 millimeter gas gun” into his
cell; shot him “in the chest and stomach” with a Taser; and “hit him on the
top of his head with the butt of the gas gun, knocking him unconscious.”57
When Castillo “regained consciousness, he was on the floor with his face
down. An officer was stepping on his hands and hitting him on his calves
with a baton, at which point Castillo passed out a second time.”58 The next
time he regained consciousness, “he was dragged out of the cell face down;
his head was bleeding, and a piece of his scalp had been detached or peeled
back.”59 The incident report falsely stated that Castillo “sustained his head
injury when he fell and accidentally hit his head on the toilet.”60
Pelican Bay guards dragged yet another prisoner, Martinez, from his cell
in handcuffs.61 They threw him against a wall, and, having knocked him
unconscious, kicked him in the “head, face, neck and shoulders.”62 Martinez
“lost four teeth, received a 1.5 inch laceration to the back of his head, and
suffered abrasions to the head, face, back, neck, chest and both legs.”63
I. Clark-Murphy v. Foreback
According to a complaint filed by his estate, Jeffrey Clark, a Michigan
prisoner, collapsed in the cafeteria line while the prison was on “heat
alert.”64 He was taken to an “observation cell,” a type of cell that “gives
officers an opportunity to observe a prisoner more closely than would be
possible if the prisoner were in the general prison population.”65 After he
was placed in the observation cell, Clark began “barking like a dog [and]
screaming at the top of his lungs.”66 Prison staff repeatedly turned off the
water to his cell over the course of several days, during which Clark asked for
water and was seen drinking from the toilet.67 He “died of dehydration.”68
J. Hadix v. Caruso
Michigan prisoner T.S., “a psychotic man with apparent delusions” who
was “screaming incoherently,” was left by correctional officers “in chains on a
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

See id. at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1164.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id.
See id. at 283–85.
See id.
Id. at 285.
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concrete bed over an extended period of time with no effective access to
medical or psychiatric care and with custody staff telling him that he would
be kept in four-point restraints until he was cooperative.”69 T.S. was
restrained in this manner for approximately four days, two of which were
“designated ‘heat alert’ days with heat index readings around 100 degrees.”70
A federal judge noted that “[f]or many hours of [his] restraint, T.S. was
naked and [lay] in his own urine.”71 Staff finally removed T.S. from
restraints after a period of “prolonged ‘sleeping.’ ”72 A minute after the
restraints were removed, “T.S. fell face first onto the concrete floor.”73 He
then fell off a toilet and could not get up on his own, at which point a nurse
checked both of T.S.’s arms and found only a “faint” pulse.74 And yet,
“neither custody staff (who checked on T.S. on regular intervals), nor psychological and nursing staff (who all saw T.S. in a state of decline) took any
action to summon emergency care when the need to do so was obvious.”75
Staff summoned an ambulance only later, when the same nurse who had
checked T.S.’s pulse returned and “found T.S. not breathing.”76 T.S. was
taken to the hospital and pronounced dead.77
K. United States v. Erie County
Before the start of litigation in United States v. Erie County,78 the U.S.
Department of Justice issued a findings letter stating that “during the booking process,” law enforcement deputies “struck a pregnant inmate in the
face, threw her to the ground, and kneed her in the side of her stomach.”79
When told she was pregnant, “the deputies allegedly replied that they
thought she was fat, not pregnant. The inmate lost her two front teeth as a
result of the assault.”80
L. DePriest v. Epps
In DePriest v. Epps, a Mississippi federal court concluded that conditions
at Walnut Grove, a youth prison, “far exceeded mere breaches of the United
69 Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 578 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
70 Id. at 579.
71 Id. at 577.
72 Id. at 579.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 580.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 724 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
79 Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil
Rights Div., to Chris Collins, Erie Cty. Exec. 18 (July 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/Erie_findlet_redact_07-15-09.pdf.
80 Id.
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States Constitution.”81 The court noted that “staff of the [prison] and those
responsible for overseeing and supervising the youth engaged in sexual relationships with the youth [and] exploited them by selling drugs in the facility.”82 Additionally, the detained youth were “frequently subjected to
chemical restraints for the most insignificant of infractions and [were]
denied necessary medical care. And although many of the offenders [had]
been ordered to finish their education, ‘the facility prevent[ed] most youth
from accessing even the most basic education services.’ ”83 The court found
“ ‘brazen’ staff sexual misconduct and brutal youth-on-youth rapes.”84
M. Jones v. Gusman
E.S., a Louisiana prisoner, was gang raped by ten to fourteen other
inmates.85 The assailants tore off E.S.’s clothes and hog-tied him with “strips
of fabric.”86 Once he was tied up, E.S.’s attackers stuck fingers, a tongue, a
toothbrush, and toothpaste in his anus.87 They wrapped a blanket around
his face and beat him.88 They “tied him to a post,” and “four to six inmates
began punching him repeatedly.”89 They “threw hot water and possibly
urine on [him], and beat him so severely with a mop stick that the skin was
ripped from his back and buttocks.”90 “At some point [while E.S. was tied to
the post], a guard performed a routine check, but he did not walk far
enough down the hall to notice E.S., naked, bound, and beaten.”91 It took
almost a year for E.S. to receive medical care.92
N. Hope v. Pelzer
While Larry Hope was imprisoned in Alabama, “guards twice handcuffed
him to a hitching post.”93 In the second instance, “the guards made him take
off his shirt, and he remained shirtless all day while the sun burned his
skin.”94 Hope was shackled to the post for seven hours, during which “he was
81 DePriest v. Epps, No. 3:10-cv-00663, 2012 BL 443032, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 26,
2012).
82 Id.
83 Id. at *2–3.
84 Id. at *4.
85 Jones v. Gusman, 296 F.R.D. 416, 437 (E.D. La. 2013).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 438. In another incident documented in the same decision, a deputy did not
investigate when he “heard what he believed to be inmates fighting on a tier, as well as
statements like ‘stick your finger in his butt and piss on him.’” Id. at 432.
93 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733 (2002).
94 Id. at 734–35.
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given water only once or twice and was given no bathroom breaks.”95 A
guard, knowing Hope was thirsty, “taunted” him: the guard “first gave water
to some dogs, then brought the water cooler closer to [Hope], removed its
lid, and kicked the cooler over, spilling the water onto the ground.”96 The
Supreme Court concluded that “Hope was treated in a way antithetical to
human dignity—he was hitched to a post for an extended period of time in a
position that was painful, and under circumstances that were both degrading
and dangerous.”97
O. Lippert v. Godinez
In Lippert v. Godinez, a court-appointed medical expert documented
numerous instances of sickening medical treatment provided by the Illinois
Department of Corrections and its healthcare contractor.98 At one prison, a
patient “presented with classic signs and symptoms of lung cancer from the
time he arrived in IDOC, yet these were ignored by health care staff for three
months. By the time he was finally diagnosed, the only treatment he was
eligible for was palliative radiation, which he declined.”99 Nine days later the
patient died.100 The report also found that another patient “had a history of
cirrhosis and was admitted to the infirmary with recurrent active GI bleeding.
Despite evidence of substantial blood loss, the patient was not sent to the
hospital until the following day; he died at the hospital two days later.”101
P. United States v. Cook County
John S., a detainee at Illinois’s Cook County Jail, was “tapping on the
wall” while being strip searched.102 He did not stop when an officer
instructed him to.103 In response, the officer “slammed him on top of a cart
and against the wall,” after which “John was pulled into the hallway[,] where
other officers started to beat him. He was hit in the face, dragged by his hair,
choked, and beaten.”104
95 Id. at 735.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 745.
98 Final Report of the Court Appointed Expert, Lippert v. Godinez, No. 1:10-cv-4603
(N.D. Ill. May 19, 2015).
99 Id. at 7.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 32.
102 See Letter from Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Att’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Todd H. Stroger, President, Cook Cty. Bd., and Thomas Dart, Sheriff, Cook Cty. 13 (July 11, 2008), https://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/04/13/CookCountyJail_findingsletter_711-08.pdf.
103 See id.
104 Id.
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Q. Hudson v. McMillian
Keith Hudson, a Louisiana prisoner, was kept “in handcuffs and
shackles” while a guard beat him “in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach.”105
Another guard “held [Hudson] in place and kicked and punched him from
behind.”106 Meanwhile, the guards’ supervisor “watched the beating but
merely told the officers ‘not to have too much fun.’ ”107
R. Riker v. Gibbons
According to a class-action complaint filed in federal court, Patrick Cavanaugh, a Nevada prisoner suffering from diabetes, hypertension, congestive
heart failure, and gangrene, “received almost no treatment for his illnesses,
so his slow, painful death in the [prison’s] infirmary was virtually assured.”108
Considering “the profound and unmistakable smell of putrefying flesh, there
can be no question that every medical provider and correctional officer in
that infirmary was acutely aware of Patrick Cavanaugh’s condition.”109 An
outside doctor who reviewed dozens of prisoners’ medical records reported
that treatment at the prison “amount[ed] to the grossest possible medical
malpractice, and the most shocking and callous disregard for human life and
human suffering,” that he had “ever encountered in [his] 35 years of
practice.”110
S. Valarie v. Michigan Department of Corrections
Anthony McManus suffered from psychosis, including schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder.111 He was locked in a Michigan prison that had no
resources for treating psychiatric illnesses,112 where, over the course of four
months, “[h]e received so little food and water that he finally succumbed to
death.”113 When a “chemical agent” was applied to McManus in an effort to
remove him from his cell, a nurse claimed that McManus was in “[n]o apparent distress,” even though, as the court stated:
[V]ideo footage of the application of the chemical spray demonstrates a very
emaciated, naked individual who appears to be in great discomfort, who is
verbalizing in an incoherent manner, and who eventually makes repeated
clear requests for water and help. Mr. McManus’ skeletal structure is clearly
105 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
106 Id.
107 Id. (citation omitted).
108 Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8–9,
Riker v. Gibbons, No. 3:08-cv-0115, 2009 WL 910971 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2009), ECF No. 15.
109 Id.
110 Ashley Powers & Henry Weinstein, Poor Medical Care at Nevada Prison, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/06/nation/na-ely6.
111 See Valarie v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:07-cv-5, 2009 WL 2232684, at *5 (W.D.
Mich. July 22, 2009).
112 See id. at *1.
113 Id. at *18
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seen protruding from the skin. During the taped footage, no one provides
Mr. McManus with any water.114

In an affidavit, an “expert prison official” stated that “[a]nimals in
animal shelters are generally given more attention and better care than was
afforded to McManus.”115
T. Brown v. Plata
In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court summarized cases of horrific medical and mental health abuse in California prisons.116 For instance, the Court
observed that suicidal prisoners were “held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth-sized cages without toilets,” and “[a] psychiatric expert
reported observing an inmate who had been held in such a cage for nearly 24
hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic.”117 According to a correctional officer, “in one prison, up to 50 sick
inmates may be held together in a 12-by 20-foot cage for up to five hours
awaiting treatment.”118 The Court also recognized instances in which prisoners had died following “significant delays in access to care,” including
[a] prisoner with severe abdominal pain [who] died after a 5-week delay in
referral to a specialist; a prisoner with “constant and extreme” chest pain
[who] died after an 8-hour delay in evaluation by a doctor; and a prisoner
[who] died of testicular cancer after a “failure of MDs to work up for cancer
in a young man with 17 months of testicular pain.”119

U. Reid v. Florida
In Reid v. Florida, the plaintiff alleged that while she was held in a Florida
prison, she was raped multiple times by “a male prison guard,” “as result [of
which] . . . [she] became pregnant.”120 The guard allegedly threatened her
with punishment if she ever reported the rapes or asked for help.121
V. Disability Rights Florida, Inc. v. Crews
Guards at Florida’s Dade Correctional Institution abused mentally ill
prisoners by, among other things, locking them in a specially modified
shower stall and leaving them there to burn beneath “scalding” water.122
Darren Rainey, a prisoner with schizophrenia, died after guards left him in
114 Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
115 Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
116 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 503–06 (2011).
117 Id. at 503–04.
118 Id. at 504.
119 Id. at 505 (quoting KENT IMAI, CAL. PRISON HEALTH CARE RECEIVERSHIP CORP., ANALYSIS OF CDCR DEATH REVIEWS 2006, at 6–7 (2007)).
120 Reid v. Florida, No. 07-21764-CIV, 2008 WL 2780991, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2008).
121 Id.
122 Complaint at 9–10, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. v. Crews, 14-cv-23323 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
9, 2014).
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the stall for ninety minutes.123 When he was discovered, 90% of his body was
burned, and “his skin fell off at the touch.”124 In photographs, “[e]ntire
swaths of [Rainey’s] skin . . . are shown missing, bunched up at the edges of
wounds or hanging loosely at the edges of wounds.”125
W. Christie v. Scott
Nick Christie was a sixty-two year-old man with “asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD), and diabetes.”126 He also suffered from
depression, and “the doctor who was treating him had recently moved,” leaving “no one to manage Christie’s spiraling emotional state, and no one to
control the possible side effects of his medication.”127 During a trip to Florida to visit his brother, he began acting erratically, and his hotel asked him to
leave; when he did not, the hotel called the police, who arrested Christie and
placed him in jail.128 There, sheriff’s deputies sprayed him “more than 12
times with pepper spray,” strapped him “naked in a restraint chair,” pulled a
“ ‘spit mask’ over his nose and mouth” without removing the pepper spray
from his body, and left him in the restraint chair “for more than five hours”
without food or water, “forcing him to soil himself.”129 “During this time,”
Christie “was not given any of his prescribed medication.”130 Christie “went
into respiratory distress” and was taken to the hospital, where he “suffer[ed]
multiple heart attacks over the next two days”; when doctors declared him
brain-dead, his body was still coated in pepper spray.131
II. PRACTICAL IMMUNITY
Prisoners in the United States face immense barriers to civil rights litigation; the existence and effectiveness of these barriers may help to explain
why prisoners continue to be subjected to chilling abuse. First, prisoners’
123 Id.
124 Eyal Press, Madness, NEW YORKER (May 2, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/02/the-torturing-of-mentally-ill-prisoners; see also Derek Hawkins, An
Inmate Died After Being Locked in a Scalding Shower for Two Hours. His Guards Won’t Be
Charged., WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2017/03/20/an-inmate-died-after-being-locked-in-a-scalding-shower-for-twohours-his-guards-wont-be-charged/?utm_term=.fb401b479c54 (reporting on same story).
125 Matt Ferner, Autopsy Photos of Inmate Allegedly ‘Boiled’ to Death Raise Questions About
State’s Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2017, 12:54 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/darren-rainey-miami-dade-shower-death-autopsy-photos_us_5983f3f7e4b04135
6ebeedb5 (containing graphic photographs of Darren Rainey’s burned flesh).
126 Christie v. Scott, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2013); see also Radley Balko,
Death in the Devil’s Chair: Florida Man’s Pepper Spray Death Raises Questions About Jail Abuse,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/11/jailabuse-nick-christie-pepper-spray-florida_n_1192412.html.
127 See Balko, supra note 126.
128 See Christie, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 126; see also Balko, supra note 126.
129 Christie, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1314, 1317–18.
130 Id. at 1314.
131 See Balko, supra note 126.
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vital constitutional protections have been attenuated by caselaw that is
extremely deferential to prison officials. Second, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act has established substantive and procedural requirements that
make it very easy to dismiss a prisoner’s complaint on the basis of a technicality. Third, prisoners’ limited access to legal resources and vulnerability to
retaliation from correctional officers make bringing a lawsuit extraordinarily
difficult and, in far too many cases, dangerous. Taken together, these barriers provide prison officials with practical immunity from liability. The conjunction of practical immunity with the well-known doctrine of qualified
immunity makes it so difficult for prisoners to win damages cases that prison
staff have almost nothing to fear from civil rights litigation.
A. Legal Barriers
1. Deference to Defendants
The legal standards governing prisoners’ constitutional claims are highly
deferential to prison officials. In the decades since it opened the federal
courts to prisoner litigation,132 the Supreme Court has been loath to permit
judges or juries to question the decisions of guards, wardens, doctors, or
other prison personnel.133 Judicial deference to prison staff manifests in virtually every standard for constitutional claims arising from official misconduct in prisons and jails, and it often hinders the vindication of prisoners’
constitutional rights.134
132 See Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 245, 255
n.2 (2012) (identifying Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam), as the first case
in which the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner could pursue a claim in federal
court under § 1983).
133 See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (explaining that
although the protections of the Constitution extend to prisoners, “courts are ill equipped
to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform”; questions of institutional competence and the separation of powers counsel “a policy of judicial
restraint” when it comes to prisoners’ rights), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411, 413 (1989); see also Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414 (overruling
Procunier because it could be read as extending too little deference to prison administrators); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987) (confirming that while prisoners have
some constitutional rights, the Court balances those rights against substantial deference to
prison administrators when it formulates and applies legal doctrines); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”);
James E. Robertson, “One of the Dirty Secrets of American Corrections”: Retaliation, Surplus Power,
and Whistleblowing Inmates, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 611, 640 n.251 (2009) (noting that in
Bell, “the Supreme Court began a concerted effort to end the expansion of prisoners’
rights by espousing a policy of deference to prison staff”).
134 See, e.g., Christopher J. Burke, Note, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Judicial Scrutiny of Prisoners’ Statutory Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 98 MICH. L. REV. 482,
487 (1999) (“[T]he Court [has] clearly stated that infringements on prisoners’ constitutional rights should be subject to loose judicial scrutiny that gives great deference to the
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In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court established the test governing
prisoners’ First Amendment claims.135 The Turner Court held that even if a
prison regulation intrudes on a prisoner’s right to free speech, the regulation
“is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”136 This
standard, even if not intended as a rubber stamp, leaves remarkable room for
deference in application.137 Turner (1) holds that a prison regulation may
infringe on prisoners’ constitutional rights so long as the regulation passes a
reasonableness test, and (2) instructs judges to defer to prison administrators
in applying the reasonableness test.138 In some cases, Turner deference has
decisions of prison administrators.”); see also Dolovich, supra note 14 (“Judicial deference
to prison officials is perhaps the strongest theme to emerge from a historical survey of
prisoners’ rights litigation in the federal courts.”); Dolovich, supra note 132, at 245 (“[The]
imperative of restraint—aka deference—has emerged as the strongest theme of the
Court’s prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.”); Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, Silencing
the Oppressed: No Freedom of Speech for Those Behind the Walls, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1005, 1010
(1993) (“[E]ntrusting trained chimps to paste up cliches from [Supreme Court decisions
regarding prisoner speech] above the word ‘denied’ would achieve roughly the same result
as seeking redress from the federal judiciary.”).
135 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. While Turner dealt with regulations restricting prisoners’
speech, see id. at 91, the Court almost immediately went on to apply its reasonableness test
to regulations restricting prisoners’ right to free exercise. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987). Soon after, the Court stated that Turner governs “all cases in which a
prisoner asserts that a prison regulation violates the Constitution, not just those in which
the prisoner invokes the First Amendment.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224
(1990) (applying Turner to prisoner’s due-process claim). Notwithstanding the strength of
that formulation, the Court later clarified that Turner’s reasonableness test applies “only to
rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper incarceration.’” Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)). Thus, where a
constitutional right must be abrogated to some extent in order to incarcerate a person, the
reasonableness test applies. Id. But the reasonableness test does not apply to claims of
racial discrimination brought under the Equal Protection Clause or to claims of cruel and
unusual punishment brought under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 510–11; see also James
E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 97, 105–07 (2006) (discussing inconsistent application of the Turner test to prisoners’
constitutional claims); Tasha Hill, Comment, Inmates’ Need for Federally Funded Lawyers: How
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Casey, and Iqbal Combine with Implicit Bias to Eviscerate Inmate
Civil Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 176, 219 (2015).
136 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
137 See id. at 89–91; see also Shapiro, supra note 9, at 988 (arguing that “Turner is not
meant to be toothless, but . . . decisions by the lower federal courts sometimes render it
so”); cf. Dolovich, supra note 132, at 246 (“[T]he Turner Court’s elaboration of each of
[the factors underlying the reasonableness standard] leaves no doubt that the test is
intended to be extremely deferential, and provides language for lower courts to draw on to
frame this deference as a legal mandate.”).
138 It is quite easy for a court to hold that an infringement on prisoners’ constitutional
rights is reasonable under Turner. In assessing reasonableness, the reviewing court must
examine “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right” asserted by the
plaintiff prisoner; if such means exist, judges “should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the
regulation.’” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (omission in original) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
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been taken to absurd extremes, such as when the Seventh Circuit upheld a
Wisconsin prison’s ban on the fantasy game Dungeons & Dragons, reasoning
that it could promote gang activity.139
Courts look differently—but no less deferentially—at claims challenging
prison officials’ use of force and the conditions of prisoners’ confinement.
Such claims arise under the Eighth Amendment.140 In the Eighth Amendment context, doctrinal deference to prison administrators generally takes
the form of exacting mens rea elements: to make out a claim, a prisoner must
produce evidence not only that she suffered objectively inhumane treatment
or conditions, but that the prison officials responsible had malign intent or
failed to remedy known risks.141
For instance, to prevail on a claim for excessive use of force, a prisoner
must show that a prison official, in using force, acted not “in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline,” but “maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm.”142 Thus, it is not enough for a prisoner
to show that a guard injured her using force that was neither necessary nor
reasonable.143 She must also show that when the guard injured her, the
U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). The court must also consider whether accommodating the prisoner’s asserted right “will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison
staff”—in which case, again, the Court admonishes that judges “should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.” Id. Finally, the court will look
to whether the plaintiff prisoner can point to a “ready”—that is, an “obvious, easy”—alternative to the challenged regulation; if not, the court will take it as evidence that the regulation is reasonable and therefore valid. Id. at 90–91. The Court carefully points out that
“this is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test.” Id. at 90; cf. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414
(overturning an earlier decision involving a prisoner’s First Amendment claim because it
could be read as permitting lower courts to apply a “least restrictive means” test to some
First Amendment cases; such a test would be insufficiently deferential to prison
administrators).
139 See Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2010).
140 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991).
141 See id. (noting that the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases “mandate inquiry into a
prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and
unusual punishment”); see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555,
1606 (2003) (“Even in the relatively expansive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which
governs incarceration-specific constitutional claims, current doctrine directs judges and
juries to focus less on the actual conditions inmates face and more on the prison officials’
mental culpability—a more difficult standard to meet, especially for unsophisticated litigants.” (footnote omitted)); Dolovich, supra note 132, at 246 (observing that Whitley
imposes an “extremely high (and extremely deferential) mens rea standard” on claims
challenging use of force against prisoners).
142 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992).
143 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (“The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security
measure . . . does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may
appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes
was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.”). This subjective element of
excessive-force claims—an element centered not on what the defendant did, but on what
motivated him to do it—is of a piece with the Court’s deferential approach to prison cases.
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guard had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”144 For the Court, a neutral
factfinder’s conclusion as to whether a prison guard’s use of force was reasonable or appropriate is not dispositive: what is dispositive is whether the prisoner can produce evidence that the guard was driven by unacceptable
motives.145 A prison official’s poor decision to use force is not to be questioned unless it was made in bad faith; if the defendant could have “plausibly” thought it was necessary to use the challenged force, then the prisoner’s
claim may be dismissed.146
Claims involving conditions of confinement are similarly dependent on
the prison officials’ states of mind. To prevail on a claim involving conditions of confinement—such as freezing or sweltering temperatures, rotten
food, insufficient clothing, failure to protect from violence, or poor medical
care—a prisoner must show that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference.”147 Without a showing of deliberate indifference, proof of “inhumane conditions of confinement” cannot trigger liability under the Eighth
Amendment—no matter how miserable the conditions might be.148
See id. at 321–22 (quoting Bell’s admonition of deference in explaining why consideration
of prison administrators’ subjective is so important).
144 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294.
145 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. According to the Court, the subjective prong of the excessive-force standard:
requires that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of
officials who have made a considered choice. Accordingly, in ruling on a motion
for a directed verdict in a case such as this, courts must determine whether the
evidence goes beyond a mere dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use
of force or the existence of arguably superior alternatives. Unless it appears that
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a
reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain under the standard we
have described, the case should not go to the jury.
Id. Notice two things about this passage. First, a dispute over reasonableness is not
enough to sustain a cause of action for excessive use of force; a prisoner who can point to
evidence that the force used against her was unreasonable may still lose at the summary
judgment stage. Second, there is no mention of the defendant’s burden to produce evidence of a good faith motive. Even when a factfinder could conclude that a guard used
more force—and caused greater injury or inflicted greater pain—than called for, the key
question remains whether the prisoner has produced evidence of malicious intent.
146 Id. at 321. A prisoner is, of course, free to argue that “the relationship between the
need and the amount of force that was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted,” is
enough for the court (or a jury) to infer that the defendant was motivated by wantonness
or maliciousness. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033). But the
defendant’s motivation remains the crux of the matter. Even if the prisoner’s injury is
terribly severe and the force exerted on her was utterly unnecessary, her claim will fail if
the court concludes that the evidence supports only an inference of poor judgment, not an
inference of maliciousness.
147 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
148 Id.; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994) (“In Wilson v. Seiter, we
rejected a reading of the Eighth Amendment that would allow liability to be imposed on
prison officials solely because of the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions.”); id. at 839–40 (expressly rejecting an objective test for deliberate indifference in
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The deliberate indifference standard limits the Eighth Amendment’s
power as a check against suffering. For instance, although the Eighth
Amendment requires the state to provide prisoners with medical care,149 a
prisoner’s claim will fail under the deliberate indifference standard if she
shows that she received medical care that was merely incompetent or negligent—no matter how badly she was harmed.150 In other words, the prisoner
may show that, objectively, her treatment amounted to medical malpractice,
but doing so will not be enough for her to press a constitutional claim.151
She must marshal further evidence that the defendants acted with a culpable
mens rea.
In the same way, although the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners,”
such as beatings or sexual assaults, the deliberate indifference standard
means that a prison official may be liable for failure to protect a prisoner
from harm only when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.”152 To meet this standard, a prisoner must prove (1) that
the defendant knew of facts from which he could infer that there was a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) that the defendant, being aware of the
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims and stating that “subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law is a familiar and workable standard . . . and we adopt it as the test for ‘deliberate indifference’ under the Eighth Amendment” (emphasis added)).
149 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (acknowledging that “elementary principles” of the Eighth Amendment establish “the government’s obligation to provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration”).
150 Id. at 106 (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or
treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297 (to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, it is not enough for an inmate to establish that he received inadequate medical
care; he must also establish that the defendant had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”).
151 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 83 (1st Cir. 2014)
(en banc) (“[E]ven if medical care is so inadequate as to satisfy the objective prong, the
Eighth Amendment is not violated unless prison administrators also exhibit deliberate
indifference to the prisoner’s needs. For purposes of this subjective prong, deliberate
indifference ‘defines a narrow band of conduct’ and requires evidence that the failure in
treatment was purposeful. . . . While deliberate indifference may . . . be exhibited by a
‘wanton disregard’ to a prisoner’s needs, such disregard must be akin to criminal recklessness, requiring consciousness of ‘impending harm, easily preventable.’” (citation omitted)
(first quoting Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 464 F.3d 158, 162 (1st Cir. 2006); then
quoting Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011); and then quoting Watson v.
Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir 1993) (per curiam))); Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178,
183–84 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This standard [for medical-care claims under the Eighth Amendment] incorporates both objective and subjective elements. The objective ‘medical need’
element measures the severity of the alleged deprivation, while the subjective ‘deliberate
indifference’ element ensures that the defendant prison official acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.”).
152 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d
556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also id. at 828 (“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
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relevant facts, actually drew the necessary inference.153 It is not enough for
the prisoner to show that the defendant could have known the prisoner was at
risk of serious harm; nor is it enough to show that the risk of serious harm
was objectively obvious.154 The prisoner’s lawsuit will move forward only if
she can prove that the defendant was subjectively aware of the risk of serious
harm.155 The prisoner who meets this state-of-mind bar faces the additional
hurdle of reasonableness: a prison official who responds “reasonably” to a
known risk of serious harm may avoid liability even if the response proves
inadequate.156 This standard is, again, intentionally deferential: in the
Court’s words, it “incorporates due regard for prison officials’ ‘unenviable
task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane
conditions.’ ”157
2. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) places further barriers
between prisoners and the courts. Here, we focus on two: first, the PLRA’s
administrative exhaustion provision, which requires prisoners to exhaust an
institution’s internal grievance procedure before filing in court;158 and second, the PLRA’s physical-injury requirement, which prohibits prisoners from
recovering compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury unless they
also suffered a physical injury.159
The PLRA states that a prisoner cannot bring federal suit “with respect
to prison conditions” until she has already exhausted all the “administrative
remedies” that the prison makes “available” to her.160 Accordingly, a violation of a prisoner’s civil liberties does not, in the first instance, give her the
right to file suit in federal court. She must first submit a grievance to prison
153 Id. at 837 (stating that to be liable under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official
“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”).
154 Id. at 838 (“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have
perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”); see also id. at 844 (noting that prison officials
can avoid Eighth Amendment liability by proving “that they were unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety”).
155 See id. at 838.
156 Id. at 844; see also id. at 845 (explaining that “prison officials who act reasonably
cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,” even if their
“reasonable” actions failed to avert harm to a prisoner).
157 Id. at 845 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)).
158 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
159 § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act . . . .”).
160 § 1997e(a).
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officials and follow the prison’s internal grievance procedure to the very end
of the line. And she must do so without a slipup. In Woodford v. Ngo, the
Supreme Court held that the PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” which
entails “using all steps that the [prison] holds out, and doing so properly.”161
Consequently, if a prisoner attempts to follow the prison’s internal grievance
procedure but makes a technical error along the way, the court can dismiss
her case, regardless of its strength on the merits.162
State and local correctional systems get to craft their own rules for handling prisoners’ grievances.163 The Supreme Court has confirmed that these
rules “need not meet federal standards” or be “plain, speedy, and effective.”164 It is not altogether surprising, then, that prisons’ internal grievance
regimes are often multilayered and exceedingly complex—after all, “nonexhaustion confers immunity from liability on prison staff.”165
161 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d
1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (“Even when
the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages,
exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit.”).
162 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 122–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Hill, supra note 135, at
199–201 (discussing the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement).
163 Schlanger, supra note 141, at 1650 (“[T]he PLRA imposes no constraints on the
structure or rules of any grievance processing regime. The administrative review scheme
can, for example, have as short a deadline for inmates and as many layers of review . . . as
the incarcerating authority chooses. Essentially, then, the sky’s the limit for the procedural
complexity or difficulty of the exhaustion regime.” (footnote omitted)).
164 Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; see also Schlanger, supra note 141, at 1627 (observing that
before the PLRA was passed, federal courts could require prisoners to exhaust internal
prison remedies only in relatively narrow circumstances, including when the federal government had certified the prison’s internal procedures as “plain, speedy, and effective”).
165 Alison M. Mikkor, Correcting for Bias and Blind Spots in PLRA Exhaustion Law, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 573, 582 (2014); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2009) (“A basic structural problem with the exhaustion requirement is that prison officials themselves . . . typically design
the grievance system that prisoners must exhaust before filing suit. This creates obvious
incentives for prison officials to design grievance systems with short deadlines, multiple
steps, and numerous technical requirements.”); Mikkor, supra, at 583–85 (cataloging evidence that corrections departments have increased the complexity and strictness of their
grievance procedures in recognition of the proper exhaustion requirement); Margo
Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case
for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 149 (2008) (arguing
that the PLRA incentivizes prisoner administrators to “fashion ever higher procedural hurdles in their grievance processes. . . . [because] the more onerous the grievance rules, the
less likely a prison or jail, or staff members, will have to pay damages or be subjected to an
injunction in a subsequent lawsuit”); id. at 141 (explaining that the PLRA’s administrative
exhaustion requirement “obstructs rather than promotes constitutional oversight” of
prison conditions because the law’s application “strongly encourages prison and jail
authorities to come up with ever-higher procedural hurdles in order to foreclose subsequent litigation”); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1019 (observing that prison grievance procedures can be difficult to navigate even for someone with the benefit of a law degree and
years of experience in prison litigation); Hill, supra note 135, at 200 (“The exhaustion
requirement incentivizes prison and jail officials to conjure up ever higher and more com-
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A complex bureaucratic regime, combined with tight deadlines, invites
technical errors. And given Woodford’s proper exhaustion standard, a technical error is enough to keep a prisoner out of court.166 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that “special circumstances,” such as a “reasonable mistake
about the meaning of a prison’s grievance procedures,” cannot excuse a prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust.167 Even trivial mistakes can be fatal to a
prisoner’s suit: submitting handwritten copies, rather than photocopies, of
required documents during the grievance process can lead to dismissal for
nonexhaustion (even if the prison’s photocopier was broken).168 So can
sending a required form to the “Inmate Appeals Branch” instead of the
“appeals coordinator,”169 submitting a carbon copy of a document instead of
the original,170 or placing multiple grievances in a single envelope instead of
separately mailing each one.171 Thus, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
has been interpreted by many federal courts to require a degree of minute
technical compliance that would be challenging for anyone, let alone someplex procedural hurdles in order to foreclose subsequent constitutional litigation. Deadlines . . . are often very short, such as two to five days, and the number of administrative
appeals required can be very large.” (footnote omitted)).
166 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–91; see also Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th
Cir. 2001) (prisoner failed to meet PLRA’s exhaustion requirement when he filed an
“administrative” appeal rather than a “disciplinary” appeal); Williams v. Burgos, No.
CV206-104, 2007 WL 2331794, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2007) (ruling that prisoner’s claim
may be dismissed for failure to exhaust when a prisoner mails the required form before
deadline but form is never received by administrators); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
165, at 14 (“[U]nder the PLRA, it is common for courts to conclude that prisoners have
failed to exhaust because they made minor technical errors in the grievance process.”);
Schlanger & Shay, supra note 165, at 148 (“[I]f prisoners miss deadlines that are often less
than fifteen days and in some jurisdictions as short as two to five days, a judge cannot
consider valid claims of sexual assault, beatings, or racial or religious discrimination.”
(footnote omitted)).
167 Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). The strictness of the total-exhaustion
rule has produced truly stupefying decisions. For instance, in Parker v. Adjetey, 89 F. App’x
886, 887 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), a prisoner appealed when his complaint was dismissed for nonexhaustion, arguing that he could not have exhausted the prison’s administrative remedies because he was hospitalized and in a coma when the grievance deadline
passed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, reasoning that the prisoner
should have filed a grievance after waking from the coma and being released from the
hospital, even though the prison’s deadline had already passed and any attempt to submit
a grievance would have been “futile.” Id. at 887–88.
168 Mack v. Klopotoski, 540 F. App’x 108, 112–13 (3d Cir. 2013).
169 See Chatman v. Johnson, No. CIV S-06-0578, 2007 WL 2023544, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July
11, 2007); see also Hamilton v. Lara, No. 1:08-cv-01967, 2011 WL 2457934, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
June 16, 2011).
170 See Fischer v. Smith, No. 10-C-870, 2011 WL 3876944, *2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2011)
(granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because prisoner failed to exhaust
when he sent required grievance form to wrong prison administrator).
171 See Freeland v. Ballard, No. 2:14-cv-29445, 2017 WL 337997, at *6–7 (S.D.W. Va. Jan.
23, 2017).
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one locked in prison. And a single lapse in technical compliance can easily
lead to dismissal of a prisoner’s otherwise meritorious claim.172
The administrative exhaustion requirement is especially onerous for
prisoners suffering from mental illness or psychological trauma.173 The sole
limitation on the exhaustion requirement is whether a prison’s internal grievance procedures were available to the prisoner during the relevant time
period; a prisoner’s suit cannot be dismissed for nonexhaustion if there were
no procedures available for her to exhaust.174 At present, it is unclear
whether a prisoner’s failure to exhaust is excusable when her mental illness
or psychological trauma makes otherwise available grievance procedures
unavailable to her. Analyzing the question, one federal court recently concluded that practical unavailability due to mental illness cannot excuse a failure to exhaust because the Supreme Court has “rejected the inward-looking
inquiry concerned with is perceived to be available by a prisoner.”175
The PLRA also prohibits prisoners from recovering compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries in the absence of a physical injury.176
This prohibition makes it exceedingly difficult for prisoners to recover for
types of abuses that are not typically accompanied by physical harm (such as
infringements of First Amendment rights). It also gives federal courts cover
172 See, e.g., Cleave v. O’Brien, No. 1:14-cv-0349, 2015 WL 4041533, at *1, *3 (S.D. Ind.
July 1, 2015) (granting summary judgment to defendants when prisoner failed to properly
exhaust, in case where prisoner’s leg was amputated); Richardson v. Stock, No. 13-cv00606, 2015 WL 160949, at *7–8 (D. Colo. Jan. 13, 2015) (dismissing claim against doctor
for nonexhaustion because prisoner made technical error in grievance process; doctor’s
interference with diabetic care led to amputation of prisoner’s leg below the knee); id. at
*7 n.6 (“It is not the Court’s position . . . to impose its desire for administrative bodies to
substantively address issues as opposed to their relying on technical formalities.”).
173 See Developments in the Law—The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114,
1147–48 (2008) [hereinafter The Law of Mental Illness] (“Many grievances arise during
acute psychotic breaks or other periods of decompensation, when inmates may be temporarily incapable of complying with grievance procedures. Additionally, drawn-out grievance procedures may produce months-long gaps in care before an inmate can seek an
injunction to compel treatment.” (footnote omitted)). Relatedly, some grievance procedures require prisoners who suffer rape or other forms of assault to come forward and
make an official report within days—an unrealistic and potentially damaging expectation.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 165, at 21–22 (“[A] person goes into a very dysfunctional state right after the trauma [of a sexual assault]. What we generally find is a dysregulation of emotions and cognition that lasts for many days. . . . And in that state a person is
unable to carry out an organized task. And that happens to be the same timeline as the
deadline for the internal grievances.” (quoting Telephone Interview Terry Kupers, Psychiatrist (Nov. 14, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hannah Brenner et al., Sexual
Violence as an Occupational Hazard & Condition of Confinement in the Closed Institutional Systems
of the Military and Detention, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 881, 902–03 (2017).
174 Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016) (“An inmate . . . must exhaust available
remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.”).
175 Galberth v. Washington, No. 14 Civ. 691, 2017 WL 3278921, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 31,
2017).
176 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012).
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for dismissing cases in which the physical injury alleged by the prisoner is
not—in the court’s view—serious enough to justify recovery.177
Today, the federal circuits are split on whether injuries to prisoners’
First Amendment interests are compensable under the PLRA. Six circuits
have concluded that First Amendment injuries are not “mental or emotional
injuries” within the meaning of the PLRA, and therefore, prisoners bringing
First Amendment claims can recover compensatory damages absent a showing of physical injury.178 In contrast, five circuits have concluded that the
PLRA’s physical-injury requirement covers prisoners’ First Amendment
claims, essentially equating First Amendment violations with mental or emotional injuries.179 The law of the latter circuits denies prisoners any right to
recover compensatory damages when prison officials deprive them of liberties widely considered fundamental—such as the ability to worship in accordance with one’s faith. This denial comes about not because First
Amendment violations are not serious, but because they do not produce a
physical injury.
Even cases that allege a physical harm may be barred by the physicalinjury requirement when the court views the harm as too minor to justify
recovery. There is general agreement among federal courts that to satisfy the
PLRA, a physical injury “must be more than de minimis, but need not be
significant.”180 Yet there is little agreement on what it takes to pass the de
minimis bar.181 Courts have dismissed cases for failing to meet the physicalinjury requirement even when they involved physical hardships that would
probably strike most people as greater than de minimis. For instance, in Watkins v. Trinity Service Group, a prisoner alleged that he “experienced diarrhea,
vomiting, cramps, nausea, and head aches from eating spoiled [maggot-ridden] food”; the court concluded that the prisoner had suffered only de
minimis physical injuries because his symptoms did not last long and because
the same symptoms “would not require a free world person to visit an emergency room, have a doctor attend to, give an opinion on, diagnosis [sic], or
177 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 165, at 24 (noting that “many courts have ruled
that injuries they deem minor do not qualify” as physical injuries under the PLRA).
178 See, e.g., Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 169–70 (4th Cir. 2017); Aref v. Lynch, 833
F.3d 242, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2016); King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015); Toliver
v. City of New York, 530 F. App’x 90, 93 n.2 (2d Cir. 2013); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778,
781–82 (7th Cir. 1999); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998).
179 See, e.g., Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011); Geiger v. Jowers,
404 F.3d 371, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723
(8th Cir. 2004); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 875–76 (10th Cir. 2001); Allah v. AlHafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2000).
180 Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted); see also
JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS’ SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL 625 (4th
ed. 2010).
181 See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 180, at 625–30 (noting disagreement among
courts as to what makes a prisoner’s physical injury more than de minimis, and exhaustively cataloging illustrative cases); Hill, supra note 135, at 201 (“[C]ourts frequently differ
on what constitutes de minimis physical injury.”).
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prescribe medical treatment for the injury.”182 In Trevino v. Johnson, a prisoner sued officers for spraying his cell with gas, hitting him twice in the face,
and pulling back on his fingers; the court concluded that the prisoner had
alleged de minimis physical injuries because his only “visible” injury was an
abrasion on the head.183 In Alexander v. Tippah County, two prisoners sued
after being forced to remain in a cell that had no toilet and a clogged floor
drain, which caused the cell to become flooded with urine, feces, and—after
the stench made one of the prisoners nauseous—vomit. The Fifth Circuit
held that the prisoners had failed to satisfy the PLRA’s physical-injury
requirement.184 And in Hancock v. Payne, a district court held that a group of
prisoners failed to meet the PLRA’s physical-injury requirement when they
“[did] not make any claim of physical injury beyond the bare allegation of
sexual assault” by a prison guard.185
Not all courts set the de minimis bar so high.186 But in many cases, the
PLRA’s physical-injury requirement has “obstructed judicial remediation of
religious discrimination, coerced sex, and other constitutional violations typically unaccompanied by physical injury, undermining the regulatory regime
that is supposed to prevent such abuses.”187
182 Watkins v. Trinity Serv. Grp. Inc., No. 8:05-cv-1142-T-24., 2006 WL 3408176, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2006); see also Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(“Injuries treatable at home and with over-the-counter drugs, heating pads, rest, etc., do
not fall within the parameters of [the PLRA physical-injury requirement].”).
183 Trevino v. Johnson, No. 905CV171, 2005 WL 3360252, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 8,
2005).
184 Alexander v. Tippah County, 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
185 Hancock v. Payne, No. 103CV671, 2006 WL 21751, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2006).
In this case, the court did not view sexual assault as a de minimis physical injury so much as
it concluded that the prisoners, despite alleging that they had been sexually assaulted,
failed to allege a physical injury at all. See Schlanger & Shay, supra note 165, at 144 (discussing Hancock and observing that “in the view of this district court, not even coerced
sodomy (which was alleged) constituted physical injury”). Notably, the relevant section of
the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), was revised in 2013 to permit an award of compensatory
damages when a prisoner alleges either a physical injury or “the commission of a sexual act.”
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1101(a), 127
Stat. 54, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e)). The fact that this revision was
necessary speaks volumes about the difficulty of meeting the physical-injury requirement.
186 See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 180, at 626 (“A number of courts have dismissed
identifiable traumatic injuries as de minimis. Others, however, have held that relatively
superficial traumatic injuries are actionable under [the PLRA].” (footnote omitted)).
187 Schlanger & Shay, supra note 165, at 141. The PLRA may prevent prisoners from
recovering compensatory damages for grave psychological injuries inflicted on them by
prolonged solitary confinement or malicious correctional officers. See, e.g., Harden-Bey v.
Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794–95 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding prisoner’s mental and emotional
injuries, inflicted by years-long, open-ended solitary confinement, were not compensable
under PLRA); see also Darvie v. Countryman, No. 9:08-CV-0715, 2008 WL 2725071, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008) (noting physical-injury requirement not satisfied by “anxiety,
depression, stress, nausea, hyperventilation, headaches, insomnia, dizziness, appetite loss,
[or] weight loss,” which are “essentially emotional in nature”); The Law of Mental Illness,
supra note 173, at 1151 (noting prisoners’ claims involving psychological injuries “have
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B. Situational Barriers
Deferential legal standards and statutory requirements make prison-conditions cases hard to win, but they are only part of the story. Prisoners face
other, situational barriers to successful litigation—that is, barriers inherent in
the reality of the prison environment. These include a scarcity of counsel,
low rates of literacy and educational attainment, limited access to evidence
and witnesses, and a paucity of legal materials. Meanwhile, the law governing
prisoners’ rights is complex, and even in the face of their practical disadvantages, incarcerated litigants must navigate a treacherous doctrinal landscape.
Pitfalls abound. Successful litigation will require a prisoner to tackle decades
of precedent on standing, capacity to be sued, prudential limits on federal
court jurisdiction, summary judgment procedure, statutory interpretation,
and supervisory liability—to name just a few of the theories that tend to converge, and may prove dispositive, in a prison-conditions suit. A handful of
sophisticated “jailhouse lawyers” can get the job done. But for experienced
attorneys, litigating against most prisoners is like shooting fish in a barrel. In
short, there is a mismatch between the disadvantages faced by incarcerated
litigants and the complex and technical legal issues they must navigate, and
this mismatch contributes significantly to the insulating effects of practical
immunity.
1. Access to Counsel
Prison-conditions cases are overwhelmingly and disproportionately litigated pro se.188 Plaintiffs represented themselves in 94.9% of prisoners’ civil
rights cases litigated in federal court in 2012 (compared to 26.1% for the
entire pool of federal cases).189 The prisoner civil rights category of federal
litigation has a higher pro se rate than any other type of case.190 The nexthighest pro se rate (88.8%) is for a category that consists of habeas cases and
been made even harder by courts that disregard the fact that severe mental distress has a
physical substrate and deny that at least some kinds of mental suffering constitute physical
injuries in and of themselves” (footnote omitted)). The ramifications of this rule are memorably illustrated by the following hypothetical, quoted by a federal court in Maryland:
[I]magine a sadistic prison guard who tortures inmates by carrying out fake
executions—holding an unloaded gun to a prisoner’s head and pulling the trigger, or staging a mock execution in a nearby cell, with shots and screams, and a
body bag being taken out (within earshot and sight of the target prisoner). The
emotional harm could be catastrophic but would be non-compensable. On the
other hand, if a guard intentionally pushed a prisoner without cause, and broke
his finger, all emotional damages proximately caused by the incident would be
permitted.
Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (alteration in original)
(quoting Plaintiff’s Brief at 14, Siggers-El, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811).
188 Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 153, 166–67, 167 tbl.6 (2015).
189 Id. at 167 tbl.6.
190 See id.
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other “quasi-criminal” cases.191 From there, it drops to 35.4% (for immigration cases).192
There are multiple reasons for prisoners’ difficulty in finding counsel.
First, attorneys have few financial incentives to take prisoners as clients. Most
prisoners cannot afford to pay counsel except through contingent fees, and
the low damages value of prison conditions cases make the cases unattractive
to lawyers who work on contingent fees.193 Many of the legal doctrines
described above, combined with qualified immunity, limit the chances of success on the merits and recovery of fees, making it less likely that a lawyer will
take a given case.194 And the PLRA imposes drastic limits on attorneys’ fees
that exacerbate the access to counsel problem.195
Second, attorneys are hard to find and harder to meet with. The United
States incarcerates more people than any other country on Earth—2.2 million men and women.196 In comparison, there are very few public interest
lawyers who litigate prison cases. Compounding the problem, prisons are
generally located far from the urban centers where attorneys are concentrated, which makes it more difficult for attorneys to meet both clients and
prospective clients.197
Third, prisoners cannot count on the government for assistance with
getting a lawyer. Courts rarely appoint counsel,198 and organizations that
receive federal funding to provide legal aid are prohibited from litigating
prison-conditions cases.199
2. Access to Law and Evidence
Although prisoners have the right to sue prison officials for violations of
the Constitution,200 they have no corresponding right to the resources necessary to litigate effectively.201 As a result, prisoners’ constitutional right to file
lawsuits does relatively little to help them protect their own civil liberties.
This is to be expected: bringing a successful lawsuit is challenging for a pro se
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1016 (noting the low average damages awarded in
prison cases litigated to judgment and stating that “[f]or private attorneys who earn a living
by winning cases and receiving both contingent fees and statutory fee awards in constitutional cases, the average prison conditions case is economically unattractive”).
194 Id. at 1016–18.
195 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2), (d)(3) (2012).
196 KAEBLE & GLAZE, supra note 22, at 1.
197 See, e.g., John M. Eason, Prison Building Will Continue Booming in Rural America,
SALON (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/03/15/why-prison-building-will-continue-booming-in-rural-america_partner/ (highlighting that between 1970 and 2000, the
number of prisons in the United States increased by more than 1000—and “roughly 70
percent” of prisons constructed during that time were in rural areas).
198 Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1016.
199 Id. at 1015.
200 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
201 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996).
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litigant under any circumstances, and it is all the more challenging for someone who, despite a “right” to file suit, is confined to a cell with scant ability to
conduct research or gather evidence.
In Bounds v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that “prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.”202 At first, this right was construed
broadly.203 Prisons were required to “assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”204 But in
Lewis v. Casey, decided nearly two decades after Bounds, the Court narrowed
its vision. Lewis holds that the right of access to the courts requires prisons to
provide no more than the tools necessary for prisoners to (a) attack their
sentences or (b) “present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights to the courts.”205 Thus, prisoners seeking redress for constitutional
violations have no right to legal assistance beyond that necessary to file a
complaint.206 Prisons may provide said assistance via a law library or some
other means.207 Yet they have no constitutional obligation to enable prisoners to “discover grievances” or “litigate effectively once in court.”208 If a prisoner has some means of filing a complaint,209 then she has “meaningful
access to the courts,” and the prison has discharged its constitutional
duty210—never mind that a successful lawsuit, even one involving a flagrant
constitutional violation, may require hundreds of pages of motions and briefs

202 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 828.
205 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825); see also Barbour v. Haley,
410 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1129 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“Lewis explained that the right of access
established in Bounds is not nearly so generous as the Bounds Court seemed to imply.”),
aff’d, 471 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2006).
206 See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; see also Payne v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 848 N.W.2d
597, 603 (Neb. 2014) (“[T]he state is required only to allow the prisoner the opportunity
to bring to court a grievance.”); Hill, supra note 135, at 197 (“After Casey, the right of
meaningful access is simply a right to file the initial papers with the court . . . .”); John
Matosky, Note, Illiterate Inmates and the Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts, 7 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 295, 298 (1998) (“[S]tates need not assist, in any way, either an inmate’s ability to
discover claims or his ability to litigate effectively beyond the pleading stage.”).
207 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351–53. The Lewis Court encouraged experimentation by prisoner administrators in finding modes of legal assistance best suited to prisoner populations, id., which may be viewed as its own form of judicial deference. See Matosky, supra
note 206, at 298 (“The right of access is not a per se right to legal libraries or assistance. It is
left largely to prison officials to determine which method of compliance will best suit the
access needs of their prisoners.”).
208 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (emphasis omitted).
209 Id. at 352 (such as “some minimal access to legal advice and a system of courtprovided forms”).
210 Id. at 351.
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in response to complex legal arguments brought by experienced
attorneys.211
Vindicating even this modest right of access to the courts is an uphill
battle, because cutting a prisoner off from legal assistance is not a constitutional violation in and of itself.212 To make out a claim for denial of access to
the courts, a prisoner must (a) specify an independent, underlying cause of
action that could have been successful if she had had sufficient access to legal
assistance, and (b) show that by denying her access to legal assistance, the
prison prejudiced her ability to pursue her underlying cause of action.213
Hence, a prisoner cannot state a claim merely by showing that a prison’s law
library or other form of legal assistance is grossly inadequate, or that her
efforts to access said resources were obstructed by prison officials.214 She
211 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1005 (describing a prisoner’s First Amendment
suit in which “altering an indefensible policy required full-blown litigation and major
expenditures: full discovery, expert witnesses, the intervention of the United States Department of Justice, and hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney time”); Ken Strutin,
Litigating from the Prison of the Mind: A Cognitive Right to Post-Conviction Counsel, 14 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 343, 349 (2016) (“The self-taught jailhouse lawyer toiling in an
inadequate law library in an extremely dangerous environment is somehow credited with
the ability to master and comply with the abstruse mazes of post-conviction procedures that
should, but often do not, open courthouse doors.”); Matosky, supra note 206, at 307
(“Prison pro se litigants constantly face opposition from highly trained and resourced state
attorneys.”).
212 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (“Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding
right to a law library or legal assistance, [a prisoner] cannot establish relevant actual injury
simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in
some theoretical sense.” The prisoner “must go one step further and demonstrate that the
alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”).
213 In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002), the Supreme Court stated that
right of access to the courts “is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff
cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.” That being so, “the underlying
cause of action . . . is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as
allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Id. Although Harbury
did not involve a suit brought by a prisoner, it did involve a claim that government officials
impeded family members’ ability to bring litigation on behalf of a prisoner, and it interpreted Lewis. Id. at 414–15. Its holdings, therefore, “would seem to be applicable to
prison cases governed by Lewis.” BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 180, at 231 n.427.
214 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; see also Gray v. Zatecky, 865 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2017)
(holding no reversible error when district court refused to toll one-year statute of limitations on prisoner’s habeas petition, even though the state waited nearly four months to
turn over vital documents and the prison was repeatedly placed on lockdown for months at
a time, during which the plaintiff had no access to the law library); Johnson v. Barczak, 338
F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s access-tocourts claim when prisoner alleged that prison officials had caused his appeals process to
be delayed by over a year, because “a delay becomes an injury only if it results in ‘actual
substantial prejudice to specific litigation’” (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 559
(7th Cir. 1995))); Ali v. District of Columbia, 278 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding prisoner had no standing to sue for denial of access to the courts when he did not allege that
he “actually lost any otherwise valid legal claim” or “that he [was] unable to raise such a
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must “go one step further” and specify in her complaint an “arguably actionable” claim that was hampered in some concrete and substantial way.215
Today’s anemic version of the right of access to the courts leaves even
the most legally sophisticated and well-informed prisoners at a severe evidentiary disadvantage.216 Prisoners overwhelmingly lack the money and freedom of movement necessary to gather evidence and place it in the record.217
Consequently, prisoners with meritorious claims—claims for which concrete
evidence likely exists—may well be forced to navigate both summary judgment and trial with nothing but their own testimony to counter the prison’s
version of events.218
The absence of any constitutional right to robust legal assistance in
prison is especially significant given the prevalence of illiteracy and mental
illness in the prison population. According to the U.S. Department of Educaclaim in any other proceeding”; prisoner’s allegation that his “‘open case’ in the District of
Columbia Superior Court” had been “set back” by prison officials was not enough to state a
claim (some internal quotation marks omitted)); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086,
1090 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that prisoner’s right of access to the courts was not violated
when his prison was on lockdown for several months, during which time he was prevented
from visiting the law library and the statute of limitations on his postconviction motion
expired; court reasoned that because the prisoner could have filed his motion before the
months-long lockdown, his inability to access the law library did not cause an “actual
injury”); Jackson v. Wiley, 352 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“A prisoner has not
been denied his right of access to the courts simply because an institution’s library is inadequate or because a prisoner’s access to that library has been restricted in some way.”).
215 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
216 Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “it
is far more difficult for a prisoner to write a detailed complaint than for a free person to do
so,” even when the prisoner knows the law well, “because he is not able to investigate
before filing suit”).
217 See Schlanger, supra note 141, at 1611 (“Inmates are unable to conduct most kinds
of informal investigations; they cannot interview most witnesses, for example. And they
cannot conduct effective discovery either, in part because of lack of legal skills and in part
because prisons and judges are extremely nervous about sharing information with prisoners. Even in a very strong case, inmates have no cash and little access to credit, so they
cannot fund litigation expenses (for example, deposition costs or expert fees) on the
expectation of an eventual judgment or settlement.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Strutin,
supra note 211, at 355 (“For those niceties of practice that lawyers take for granted, inmates
must contend with prison rules, inadequate libraries, and unresponsive or uncooperative
information sources in the outside world. Thus, meeting a deadline, obtaining a witness
affidavit, consulting with an expert, or acquiring a hard to find piece of research is wellnigh impossible.”).
218 See Schlanger, supra note 141, at 1615 (“[B]ecause inmates are unable to run investigations of their cases in order to get documentary or testimonial support for their claims,
oftentimes at trial the best an inmate can do is turn the case into a swearing contest.”); see
also Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1010–11 (describing the tremendous difficulty of obtaining
evidence in a First Amendment suit even when plaintiff prisoners were represented by the
ACLU). Additionally, the few pro se prisoners who claw their way to the damages phase of
a trial are confronted with a paradox: they “have the nearly impossible task of simultaneously conducting effective litigation and trying to demonstrate to the court or jury just how
devastating their injury was.” Schlanger, supra note 141, at 1612.
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tion, many prisoners are unable to “cycle through or integrate two or more
pieces of information based on criteria; compare and contrast or reason
about information requested in the question; or navigate within digital texts
to access and identify information from various parts of a document.”219 It is
difficult to imagine such a prisoner bringing—much less winning—a civil
rights suit in federal court without substantial legal assistance, no matter how
egregiously the prison violates the Constitution.
Estimates vary on the prevalence of mental illness among prisoners, but
there is widespread agreement that the rate is disproportionately high.220
Although there are many varieties of mental illness, some of which may
impede pro se litigants more than others, it is reasonable to assume that
mental illness makes it harder for a prisoner to successfully file and pursue a
meritorious claim. This is deeply troubling in light of research showing that
prisoners who report symptoms of mental illness are more likely than other
prisoners to report being sexually abused while incarcerated.221
219 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE U.S.
PIAAC SURVEY OF INCARCERATED ADULTS 6, B-3 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/
2016040.pdf (reporting that twenty-nine percent of prisoners assessed in national survey
lacked key reading comprehension skills); see also Matosky, supra note 206, at 301–02 (discussing a 1994 study of literacy among the prison population).
220 See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (reporting that in 2005, “56% of State prisoners, 45% of Federal prisoners, and 64% of jail inmates” had “a mental health problem”); Seth J. Prins, Prevalence of
Mental Illnesses in U.S. State Prisons: A Systematic Review, 65 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 862, 866
(2014) (concluding, from meta-analysis of scholarly literature on mental illness in prison,
that despite the “wide variation in prevalence [of mental illness] found among even the
more robust studies,” the “current and lifetime prevalence of numerous mental illnesses is
higher among incarcerated populations than in nonincarcerated populations, sometimes
by large margins”); Dahlia Lithwick, Prisons Have Become America’s New Asylums, SLATE (Jan.
5, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/01/prisons_have_become_warehouses_for_the_mentally_ill.html. Briefly surveying research on
mental illness among prisoners, Edward P. Mulvey and Carol A. Schubert, of the University
of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, have written that:
Once mentally ill people are arrested, the dynamics of criminal justice
processing contribute to their high prevalence rates in jails and prisons. People
with serious mental illness, compared with others charged with similar offenses,
stay longer in jail. They are less likely to be placed on probation or other forms of
community-based supervision. Mentally ill prison inmates are more likely to be
involved in assaults while there and more likely to be assault victims. Perhaps not
surprisingly, mentally ill inmates are less likely to be granted parole at an early
date and are more likely to serve out their maximum sentences. They are also
more likely once released to violate parole conditions and be returned to prison
as a result.
Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Mentally Ill Individuals in Jails and Prisons, 46 CRIME
& JUST. 231, 236–37 (2017) (citations omitted).
221 ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12, at 7 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf (“[I]nmates with serious psychological distress reported higher
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3. Traps for the Unwary
Prisoners’ rights litigation is a complicated and technical area of law.
Effective practice requires a grasp of constitutional law under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments; the law of immunities; civil procedure; standing; supervisory liability; administrative exhaustion; various doctrines unique to § 1983 litigation; prudential limitations on federal court
procedure; and a variety of federal statutes, including the PLRA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act.
The complexity of the doctrine creates a minefield for prisoners litigating without counsel and enhances the practical immunity of prison officials.
A few examples of doctrines that trip up pro se litigants include:
Sovereign Immunity. Prisoners quite naturally name as defendants entities
such as the prison in which they are incarcerated, the department of corrections of their state, or the state itself. A case naming only such parties, however, will be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.222
Capacity to Be Sued. Detainees in county jails often name the jail or the
sheriff’s department running the jail as defendants. While these municipal
entities do not enjoy sovereign immunity, suits naming such parties have
nonetheless been dismissed where state law deems jails and sheriff’s departments to be components of county governments—not separate defendants
with the capacity to be sued.223 Even if a detainee is savvy enough to name a
proper county defendant—the county itself, or the sheriff in her official
capacity, for example—the detainee may not know that policy and practice
allegations are necessary to state a claim under Monell.224
Supervisory Liability. Prisoners might assume that a warden is legally
responsible for what happens in her prison, or that a lieutenant is liable for
what happens in her division. Not so. Section 1983 suits against supervisors
rates of inmate-on-inmate sexual victimization than inmates without mental health
problems.”); E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 158–74 (2013); Nancy Wolff et al., Rates of Sexual
Victimization in Prison for Inmates with and Without Mental Disorders, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS.
1087, 1093 (2007) (noting that persons with “mental disorder[s]” are “more likely than
their counterparts without mental disorders to experience sexual victimization inside
prison”).
222 See, e.g., Parks v. Reans, 510 F. App’x 414, 415 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal of federal prisoner’s Bivens action on basis of sovereign immunity);
Fields v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 2:15-cv-1271, 2015 WL 6755310, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 4, 2015) (dismissing state prisoner’s claim against Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction on basis of sovereign immunity).
223 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) (capacity to be sued is determined by state law); see, e.g., Dean
v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s
claim against sheriff’s department because sheriff’s department lacked capacity to be sued
under state law, noting that “[s]heriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit”).
224 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
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require a showing of personal involvement by the supervisor and cannot be
premised on a theory of respondeat superior.225
Diffusion of Responsibility. In prisons and jails, responsibility for a calamity
may be diffused among many actors. For example, a group of doctors,
nurses, and officers may each commit mistakes in noticing and treating symptoms that result in a severe and preventable medical injury. It is logical
enough for a prisoner to think that these officials should be held collectively
liable because they are collectively responsible for the wrong. But if none of
the officials’ acts or omissions individually constitute deliberate indifference,
all of them will escape liability.226
Administrative Exhaustion. Prisoners may not realize that insignificant
mistakes in exhausting administrative remedies can doom their civil rights
suits. Courts have dismissed federal cases based on administrative exhaustion
mistakes such as failing to attach copies of documents to a grievance or mailing multiple grievance appeals in a single envelope.227
Summary Judgment Evidence. It is probably not obvious to most people
that a single sentence can make the difference between winning and losing
on summary judgment—but it can. When a prisoner signs and dates her
complaint or statement and writes “I declare under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is true and correct,” the complaint or statement is considered
“verified,” and the prisoner can use it as evidence to establish a dispute as to
material fact. (Provided that the facts in the complaint or statement are
based on the prisoner’s personal knowledge.) In contrast, a complaint or
statement containing exactly the same content but lacking the magic quoted
words generally will not suffice to create a dispute as to material fact.228
225 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see also Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d
1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[S]upervisor status is not sufficient to create § 1983
liability.”).
226 See, e.g., Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sherriff, Seminole Cty., 871 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2017);
Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014); Mikell v. Folino, No. 17-1049,
2018 WL 834200, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 13, 2018) (per curiam).
227 See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
228 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2012) (permitting an unsworn declaration or statement to stand
in for a sworn affidavit when the person making the statement signs it and certifies it as
true under penalty of perjury); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts
of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials . . . .”); see Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(“On summary judgment, factual allegations set forth in a verified complaint may be
treated the same as when they are contained in an affidavit.”); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d
795, 798–99 (8th Cir. 1994) (“For summary judgment purposes, we must believe the allegations in [plaintiff prisoner’s] verified complaint as they are evidence to the same extent as
statements in a sworn affidavit.”); Lelieve v. Oroso, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1299 n.2 (S.D.
Fla. 2012) (ruling that facts alleged in prisoner’s verified original complaint were evidence
for purposes of summary judgment, but facts alleged in prisoner’s unverified amended
complaint were not).
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Heck Bar. Prisoners can shorten their period of incarceration by earning “good time” for their behavior, but they can also lose good time (and
incur other punishments) for disciplinary violations. Prisoners may think
they have a federal claim for disciplinary sanctions imposed without due process, but Heck v. Humphrey and its progeny prevent prisoners from challenging in federal court a state disciplinary punishment that increases the
duration of confinement.229
Mootness. Corrections systems often transfer prisoners from one prison
to the next. A prisoner who suffers from lack of medical treatment or denial
of religious access at one prison may assume that a claim for injunctive relief
remains live after transfer to another prison, especially if similar wrongs
occur at the new facility. But when a prisoner is transferred, a court is likely
to view her claims for injunctive relief as moot.230
4. Retaliation
For prisoners, suing correctional officials is not only difficult, but dangerous.231 Guards and administrators wield extraordinary power over prisoners’ lives; when prisoners try to vindicate their rights, they are vulnerable to
retaliatory punishment.232 A prisoner who files a grievance or a lawsuit may
be beaten, raped, placed in solitary confinement, denied medical care, transferred to a new facility far from loved ones, verbally abused, or labeled a
snitch.233 Prisoners know these risks, and know that they are not remote:
229 Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
230 See, e.g., Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]s a general
rule, a prisoner’s transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there.”); Salahuddin v. Goord,
467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n inmate’s transfer from a prison facility generally
moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that facility.”). A prisoner may, however, overcome a mootness defense if she challenges a policy implemented
across an entire prison system. See, e.g., Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 138–39 (4th Cir.
2018) (holding that prisoner’s transfer did not moot claim for injunctive relief involving
systemwide policy that regulated participation in religious meal program); Aref v. Lynch,
833 F.3d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (applying voluntary cessation exception to defense of
mootness and also noting that transfer would not moot a prisoner’s claim for injunctive
relief involving a procedure used by the Bureau of Prisons to assign inmates to “communications management units”).
231 Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 283 (2010) (“Not only do inmates face procedural difficulties in
complying with prison administrative grievance policies, but prisoners may also fear retaliation from prison officials for filing grievances.”).
232 John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 429, 431 n.7 (2001) (collecting cases and stating that “[o]ne of the dirty
secrets of American corrections is the persistence of covert threats and retaliation against
prisoners who complain about their treatment, including those who use the grievance systems that the PLRA has now made mandatory”).
233 See, e.g., Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 162 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (plaintiff
prisoner filed “emergency grievance requesting that prison officials protect him from his
cell mate,” prison officials “took no measures to protect him,” and his cellmate stabbed
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retaliation is part and parcel of prison life.234 Naturally, then, some prisoners choose not to file grievances regarding constitutional violations, because
doing so will make them into targets.235 If they later file suit, their case will
be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, unless they can
convince the court that the threat of retaliation rendered those remedies
unavailable.236 Prisoners “are at the mercy of their keepers,”237 and they
know that if they try to assert their constitutional rights, they can be made to
suffer.238
him; shortly thereafter, plaintiff was transferred to a “stripped segregation cell,” where
officers threatened him and denied him medical care; he was then brought to an empty
shower room, where officers beat him, “intimidated him with police dogs,” and pepper
sprayed him in the eyes and mouth before returning him to segregation, where he was
placed in four-point restraints); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 260 (3d Cir. 2003)
(affirming denial of summary judgment to prison officials when prisoner alleged that in
retaliation for filing lawsuit, prison officials placed him in solitary confinement, withheld
his legal documents, denied him his one hour of recreation, took notes about his case
from his cell and read them over the intercom, and prevented him from making telephone
calls to his attorney); Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 581 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (reversing dismissal of retaliation claim when prisoner alleged that to punish him
for filing grievances, prison officials transferred him to a facility far from his seriously ill
parents and had him reclassified as a “special offender” who was ineligible for higherpaying prison jobs); Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1404 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(“[Prisoner] specifically alleged that the defendants forced him to choose between hygiene
items and pursuing grievances and legal actions, seized his legal materials and transferred
him into administrative segregation in retaliation for bringing suit against prison officials,
and threatened him with further retaliation if he did not stop complaining.”); see also
Marissa C.M. Doran, Note, Lawsuits as Information: Prisons, Courts, and a Troika Model of
Petition Harms, 122 YALE L.J. 1024, 1028 (2013) (collecting cases and stating that
“[r]etaliation against prisoners can take many forms: officials might send prisoners to solitary confinement, deny essential services, construct false weapons charges, or subject prisoners to beatings, verbal abuse, or rape, all as punishment for attempting to communicate
with the world outside the prison”).
234 Robertson, supra note 133, at 613 (“Correctional officers who retaliate against
inmates cannot be regarded as rogue actors.”).
235 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 117–19 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (repeatedly
observing that prisoners with meritorious claims might well choose not to file grievances
out of fear of retaliation); Robertson, supra note 133, at 644 (“Grievance-motivated retaliation deters inmates from filing grievances and itself generates litigation . . . .”); id.
(“[R]etaliation against [inmates who file grievances] acquires a functional quality, to wit,
the prospect of deterring the target from filing suit and deterring other inmates from
filing grievances.”).
236 Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1860 (2016) (noting that failure to exhaust may be
excused when prison officials “thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation”); see also id. at 1860 n.3 (collecting appellate cases to the same effect).
237 Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 23 (2d Cir. 1971).
238 “[T]he very architecture of incarceration gives prison officials, in a practical sense,
enormous power over the incarcerated. . . . [P]rison life render[s] prisoners deeply vulnerable to those officers whose actions, whether from malice, caprice, or simple indifference,
transgress the legal bounds of their authority.” Dolovich, supra note 14, at 904. Given
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III. UNQUALIFIED IMPUNITY
In combination, practical and qualified immunity provide prison and jail
officials with an ironclad defense in nearly every case. Prison officials’ de
jure immunity from suit may be qualified, but their de facto immunity borders on absolute. For individual officers, especially, the threat of direct pecuniary loss as a result of prisoner litigation is so remote that it cannot
rationally lead to behavior modification. There are two main reasons for this.
First, prisoners almost never win money judgments against individual
officers, and when they do, the judgments are not large. Second, even when
prisoners do win money judgments against individual officers, the officers are
likely to be indemnified, so that they never pay anything out of their own
pockets. Taken together, these factors eviscerate suits for damages as a
meaningful check on individual officers’ behavior.
As Margo Schlanger has demonstrated, victories in prison cases are rare,
and when prisoners do win, the judgments awarded to them are relatively
minor. In fiscal year 2012, prisoners won their cases only fifty-seven times,
and the total damages for all prison conditions cases litigated to judgment in
fiscal year 2012 barely broke $1 million.239 The average award was $20,815
and the median was $4185.240 By way of comparison, consider police misconduct cases. Between 2004 and 2014, the Chicago Police Department
alone averaged $66 million in yearly payouts.241 The comparison is far from
perfect, because the nationwide prison and jail total includes only verdicts,
whereas the Chicago Police Department total includes both verdicts and settlements. Nevertheless, the immense disparity is suggestive of something that
experienced attorneys (those who represent prisoners and those who
represent prisons) know well: “when prisoners do litigate all the way to victory, they tend to win pretty small.”242
In the unusual instance of a prisoner wining a suit for damages, the
chance of a correctional officer paying out of pocket approaches zero.
Joanna Schwartz’s meticulous empirical work has exposed the “personal liability” of law enforcement officers as a legal fiction: law enforcement agencies
indemnify their officers against monetary judgments and settlements, and it
is exceedingly rare for officers to pay a damages award out of their own
pocket.243 Although Schwartz’s research focuses on police officers, not cor-

these circumstances, a prisoner’s attempt to assert her rights “may only provoke renegade
officers to even greater aggression.” Id.
239 Schlanger, supra note 188, at 168 tbl.7.
240 Id.
241 How Chicago Racked up a $662 Million Police Misconduct Bill, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar.
20, 2016), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160320/NEWS07/160319758/howchicago-racked-up-a-662-million-police-misconduct-bill.
242 Schlanger, supra note 188, at 168.
243 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912–15 (2014).
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rectional officers as such, there is reason to believe that personal liability is
just as mythical in prison cases as it is in police cases.244
Admittedly, indemnification alone does not erase all individual deterrents to abuse. For instance, a prison guard might be aware that a large civil
judgment can negatively affect her credit, even if she is indemnified.245 She
might be concerned that an adverse verdict or settlement will lead to professional discipline, loss of a promotion, or termination.246 Or her behavior
might be reined in by a strict, conscientious superior who wants to avoid
passing liability onto taxpayers.247
But when indemnification is layered atop the other barriers to suit
described in this Article, it is all but impossible to believe that the present
regime of civil liability has any significant effect on individual officers’ behavior. Recall that doctrinal and situational obstacles to prisoner litigation drastically reduce the likelihood of a correctional officer ever being subject to an
adverse judgment. Officers are therefore shielded not only against the direct
monetary costs of liability, but from all the collateral effects that might flow
from an adverse judgment. And when a prisoner does win, indemnification
almost invariably kicks in, shielding the liable officer against pecuniary loss.
Because the probability of an adverse judgment and the probability of direct
loss in the event of an adverse judgment are both very low, paying individually for a constitutional violation committed in a prison or jail is analogous to
getting hit by lightning twice.248
Along with reducing the effectiveness of civil liability as a check on individual officers’ behavior, the barriers to prisoner litigation discussed in this
Article undercut the role of money damages as an incentive for policymakers
to prevent abuse. The courts have long maintained that the threat of damages “encourage[s] those in a policymaking position to institute internal
rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional
infringements on constitutional rights.”249 Damages, imposed directly or
indirectly, are “particularly beneficial in preventing those ‘systemic’ injuries
that result not so much from the conduct of any single individual, but from
the interactive behavior of several government officials.”250 Thus, the theory
244 Fifteen of the eighty-one law enforcement agencies in Schwartz’s study were sheriff’s
departments with responsibilities that included operating a county jail. Id. at 905. According to Margo Schlanger, “in nearly all inmate litigation, it is the correctional agency that
pays both litigation costs and any judgments or settlements, even though individual officers
are the nominal defendants.” Schlanger, supra note 141, at 1676.
245 Schlanger, supra note 141, at 1675 n.389.
246 Schwartz, supra note 243, at 941.
247 Id.
248 This is not to say that prisoners never prevail. For example, in some of the egregious cases described in Part I, plaintiffs were able to overcome qualified immunity. The
point is that the barriers to victory for prisoners are extremely high, while the barriers to
immunity or indemnification for correctional officers are extremely low.
249 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S 622, 652 (1980).
250 Id.
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goes, indemnification encourages policymakers to enact systemic reforms by
shifting the costs of injuries to government entities.251
But this justification for indemnification loses force in the prison context, where barriers to litigation make indemnification a last resort. Practical
immunity does not shift liability—it defeats it. And the prisoner lawsuits that
make it through the practical/qualified-immunity screen to trigger indemnification are too few, and their judgments too small, to have an appreciable
effect on policy decisions. Consequently, the cost-shifting function of indemnification protects individual officers from loss while exerting little to no
deterrent influence on policymakers.
On the whole, the sheer inhumanity of the abuse that regularly occurs in
our prisons and jails suggests that neither the threat of liability nor other
potential deterrents are doing enough to modify correctional officers’ behavior. We do not know the marginal effect of liability as a deterrent—that is,
we do not know how much worse it might be if correctional officers were, say,
entitled to absolute immunity as a matter of formal doctrine. That said,
when a so-called deterrent fails to prevent the types of hideous episodes cataloged throughout this Article, it is not working the way it must.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown, we hope, that the practical realities insulating
correctional officers from suit add up to a regime of overkill. The “balance”
between holding officers accountable and shielding them from liability for
excusable mistakes is not really a balance at all.
The jurisprudence may have developed this way in part because the
Supreme Court makes qualified immunity law principally in police cases,
even though the same doctrine has an enormous impact on prison cases.
Over the past twenty years, only 17% of qualified immunity cases decided in
the Supreme Court arose from events in a prison or jail. A far higher proportion—64%—involved police functions outside of prisons and jails. There
were nearly four times as many police cases as prison cases. (Cases in neither
category accounted for the remaining 19%.) The predominance of police
cases may help to explain why the doctrine of qualified immunity is so illsuited to prison-conditions litigation.252 The law is made in police cases, but
251 Although the Court recognized the role of damages in deterring unconstitutional
state and local policies in Owen, 445 U.S. at 652, it has rejected damages as a check on
unconstitutional federal policies. The Supreme Court recently stated that a suit for damages is not an appropriate means of altering institutional policies set by high-level federal
officials. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017) (“[I]t must be noted that a
Bivens action is not ‘a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy.’” (quoting Corr. Servs.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001))).
252 In the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has decided a qualified immunity issue
in thirty-five cases. We divided those cases into three categories—prison cases, police
cases, and other cases. We show the result in the Appendix. Prison cases consist of the
qualified immunity decisions arising from events that occurred in a prison or jail. Police
cases consist of qualified immunity decisions arising from police functions that occur
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then transsubstantively applied to prison cases with little attention to the difference in context.
As we note above, a more context-sensitive approach to prison cases
would have courts consider deferential legal standards, the PLRA, situational
barriers, and qualified immunity not as discrete systems unto themselves, but
as components of an overarching regime of civil liability for prisoner abuse.
The Supreme Court has never considered the combined effect of practical
and qualified immunity on the landscape of prison officials’ liability. This is
a problem. If a doctrine (i.e., qualified immunity) is crafted to give state
actors the “right” level of protection from liability, but it fails to account for
other factors that also protect the same state actors from liability, then the
overall regime for liability will be skewed toward overprotection of state
actors and against vindication of federal rights.
Of course, this contextual approach should have limits. For example, a
court that tried to soften a procedural provision of the PLRA in order to
account for the deference accorded to prison officials under the Eighth
Amendment would undermine Congress’s intent to limit prisoner suits by
enacting the PLRA. In other circumstances, however, a more holistic analysis
would be not only permissible, but preferable to the status quo, in which
courts all but eliminate liability by piling up one obstacle to litigation after
another.
The case for a contextual approach to the system of liability for prison
misconduct is strongest in lawsuits that involve multiple doctrines that aim to
balance individual liberties against a government interest. Take a suit for
damages under the First Amendment for violation of a prisoner’s religious
freedom. The court will analyze the prisoner’s claim under the deferential
standard established in the Turner/O’Lone line of cases, which requires balancing the constitutional liberties retained by the prisoner against the government’s interest in prison security. The defendant official may also assert
qualified immunity, which, like Turner, is designed to strike a balance
between imposing liability for misconduct and providing insulation to state
actors. Current law requires the two forms of deference to be stacked atop
one another. But such deference stacking may not achieve the balance for
which both Turner and qualified immunity were designed. Instead of stacking the Turner test on top of the qualified immunity test in a formalistic manner, the better question for the court to consider may be: in this case, what
overall level of deference best achieves the purposes of both qualified immunity and the substantive constitutional standard?
There is a glimmer of this approach in the Supreme Court’s most recent
decision on the constitutional standards that apply to conditions of confinement. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Court held that pretrial detainees are
entitled to a more protective constitutional standard in excessive force cases
outside prisons and jails (such as performing a search, managing political protesters, chasing fleeing suspects, or shooting people perceived as dangerous). The final category comprises every other Supreme Court decision on qualified immunity—cases brought against
prosecutors, public school principals, and other government employees.
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than convicted prisoners whose excessive force claims are subject to the
“malicious and sadistic” standard.253 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer
asserted that even given a less deferential constitutional standard for pretrial
detainees, “an officer who act[ed] in good faith” would have sufficient insulation from suit—in part because of the availability of qualified immunity.254
Thus, in Kingsley, qualified immunity and deference in a substantive constitutional standard were considered not in isolation, but in overall effect.255 The
Court recognized, in a limited and implicit manner, that the interaction of
the two doctrines ought to be calibrated to accomplish a function: providing
correctional officers in jails with adequate, but not excessive, insulation from
suit.256
This is a good starting point, and it suggests additional questions that
courts should consider in evaluating the liability regime for violations of federal rights in America’s prisons and jails. Given the high level of deference
baked into the relevant constitutional standards, can qualified immunity be
justified at all in prison and jail cases? Conversely, does the existence of qualified immunity weaken the case for deference in the substantive standards?
Should the situational factors that protect prison officials from liability
inform the level of deference they receive through both qualified immunity
and substantive constitutional law?
This much is clear: conditions in American prisons and jails call out for
much greater accountability than damages litigation can provide in its present state.

253 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
254 Id. at 2474–75.
255 Id.
256 Id.; see also Dolovich, supra note 132, at 252 (“[I]t is . . . possible that even a Court
ordinarily inclined to adopt deliberative strategies sympathetic to defendant prison officials may hesitate to do so in cases where the applicable law already features both highly
deferential substantive standards and a host of procedural rules rewritten to be more onerous for prisoners than for other § 1983 plaintiffs.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL508.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 43

17-JUL-18

unqualified impunity in prison

14:54

2063

APPENDIX
Case Name
Richardson v. McKnight
Hope v. Pelzer
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Ortiz v. Jordan
Taylor v. Barkes
Ziglar v. Abbasi
Wilson v. Layne
Hanlon v. Berger
Saucier v. Katz
Chavez v. Martinez
Groh v. Ramirez
Brosseau v. Haugen
Muehler v. Mena
Scott v. Harris
L.A. County v. Rettele
Pearson v. Callahan
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd
Ryburn v. Huff
Messerschmidt v. Millender
Reichle v. Howards
Stanton v. Sims
Plumhoff v. Rickard
Wood v. Moss
Carroll v. Carman
City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan
Mullenix v. Luna
Hernandez v. Mesa
White v. Pauly
Kisela v. Hughes
Conn v. Gabbert
Hartman v. Moore
Wilkie v. Robbins
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding
Camreta v. Greene
Filarsky v. Delia
Lane v. Franks

Reporter
521 U.S. 399
536 U.S. 730
556 U.S. 662
562 U.S. 180
135 S. Ct. 2042
137 S. Ct. 1843
526 U.S. 603
526 U.S. 808
533 U.S. 194
538 U.S. 760
540 U.S. 551
543 U.S. 194
544 U.S. 93
550 U.S. 372
550 U.S. 609
555 U.S. 223
563 U.S. 731
565 U.S. 469
565 U.S. 535
566 U.S. 658
571 U.S. 3
134 S. Ct. 2012
134 S. Ct. 2056
135 S. Ct. 348
135 S. Ct. 1765
136 S. Ct. 305
137 S. Ct. 2003
137 S. Ct. 548
138 S. Ct. 1148
526 U.S. 286
547 U.S. 250
551 U.S. 537
557 U.S. 364
563 U.S. 692
566 U.S. 377
134 S. Ct. 2369

Year
1997
2002
2009
2011
2015
2017
1999
1999
2001
2003
2004
2004
2005
2007
2007
2009
2011
2012
2012
2012
2013
2014
2014
2014
2015
2015
2017
2017
2018
1998
2006
2007
2009
2011
2012
2014

Classification
Prison
Prison
Prison
Prison
Prison
Prison
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
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